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Over the last few years, the world has been shocked by a new wave of political confl ict, including the 
events of the Arab Spring and the confl ict in Ukraine. This dissertation evaluates the causes of political 
confl ict and its consequences for investments by multinational enterprises (MNEs). The studies that
are part of this thesis aim to improve our understanding of the relationships between political confl ict, 
investment and ultimately human prosperity. These three concepts are interdisciplinary in nature and 
the di erent chapters included in this thesis reflect this. By combining conceptual frameworks and
methodologies from economics and business research, they shed light on the increasing levels of political
confl ict and the reaction of fi rms to this development.
In the fi rst part of this thesis, the causes of non-violent political confl ict are examined. The findings 
demonstrate that a decrease in subjective wellbeing (i.e. happiness) can motivate citizens to engage
in acts of civil resistance. In the second part, the consequences of armed political confl ict for Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) are examined. The e ect of political violence on greenfi eld FDI is heterogeneous
across types of violence, sectors and fi rms, falsifying the claim that all FDI fl ows are negatively aected 
by political violence. In addition, the results indicate that similar to international confl ict; internal wars can 
disturb existing relationships between the MNEs’ home and host country. 
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interfi rm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to o er an advanced doctoral
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD
candidates are active in the di erent research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating
new business knowledge.
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation evaluates the causes of political conflict and its consequences for 
investments by multinational enterprises (MNEs). The studies that are part of this thesis 
aim to better understand the relationships between political conflict, investment and 
ultimately human prosperity. These three concepts are interdisciplinary in nature and the 
different chapters included in this thesis reflect this. By combining conceptual frameworks 
and methodologies from economics and business research, they shed light on the 
increasing levels of political conflict and the reaction of firms to this development. The 
papers in this dissertation are inspired by the movement within business research to 
address ‘Grand Challenges’, which is reflected not only in the interdisciplinary approach, 
but also in the phenomena-driven perspective (Buckley, Doh & Benischke, 2017). Section 
1.1 of this introductory chapter sketches the problem of an ‘increasingly conflict-afflicted 
world’ and the phenomenon of widespread multinational activity in conflict-afflicted 
regions. Section 1.2 elaborates on the motivation behind this research project. Section 1.3 
provides an outline of this dissertation. This section includes a graphical representation of 
the concepts studied (Figure 1.3) and an overview of the different chapters (Table 1.2). 
Finally, to ensure that my co-authors in this dissertation get credit for their work, their 
contributions are discussed in Section 1.4. 
2 
1.1 THE CONTEXT 
1.1.1 An increasingly conflict-afflicted world 
On December 17, 2010 at noon Mohammed Bouazizi set himself – and indirectly Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria – on fire. It is unlikely that he could have predicted the 
consequences of his final act of despair. Yet, it became the last straw that broke the camel's 
back and eventually led to the ousting of four dictators and the outbreak of several large 
scale armed conflicts. In the first months of the Arab Spring, there was hope of democracy 
and social justice. However, at the start of my PhD trajectory, in summer 2013, the Arab 
Spring had turned in an Arab Winter; there was a full-scale civil war in Syria which had 
left nearly 100.000 death and in Egypt General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi had just removed 
Mohammed Morsi from power and suspended the constitution (Black, 2013; Kingsley & 
Chuloy, 2013). In the years that followed and in which I fully developed the articles in this 
dissertation, human rights remained under attack across the Arab region and the conflicts 
in Syria, Yemen and Libya merely escalated (Amnesty International, 2016). This also had 
a major consequences for the rest of the world, as the conflicts lead to the largest refugee 
crises of the 21st century and created fears of terrorist attacks across the globe.  
Since the end of the Cold War there had been a discernible downward trend in the number 
and intensity of armed conflicts, defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one 
calendar year” (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015, p. 1)1. The global decline in conflict 
brought about optimism that wars are waning (e.g. Goldstein, 2011). However, in recent 
years the number and severity of conflicts has increased again (See Figure 1.1). In 2015 
UCDP recorded a total of 50 armed conflicts relative to 32 in 2005; an increase of 56.3% 
within a decade (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002). The 
conflicts that resulted from the Arab Spring can to a large extent account for this increase, 
but political violence has also escalated in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Ukraine. 
Unfortunately, due to the consequences of climate change we can expect to see an even 
further increase in the number of armed conflicts in the future (Harrari & La Ferrara, 2012; 
Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Hsiang, Meng & Cane, 2011).  
The current wave of armed conflict is different from those that plagued previous eras. Few 
of these conflicts are interstate, i.e. fought between two state actors. Instead the majority of 
present-day armed conflicts are intrastate, although often international actors are involved 
such as the U.S. interference in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the fact that almost all 
armed conflicts are located in middle and low income countries, several of these conflicts 
have also lead to a renewed fear of terrorist attacks, refugee crises or nuclear attacks in  
1 The terms armed conflict and violent (political conflict) are used interchangeable 
throughout this PhD dissertation.  
3 
Figure 1.1 Armed conflict in 2005 and 2015 (UCDP PRIO, 2017). 
Conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths (BRD) and less than 1,000 (BRD) in one 
calendar year are colored light grey, whereas wars defined as armed conflicts that caused 
at least 1,000 BRD are colored dark grey  
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high income economies. In addition, there is preliminary evidence that the origins of the 
current conflicts are different and that existing models of civil war are unable to fully 
explain their causes (Duffield, 2014). For example, both the Arab Spring and the Ukrainian 
uprising can hardly be explained with traditional models of civil war which focus merely 
on GDP growth and ethnic fractionalization (Arampatzi et al., 2017; Kurkov, 2014). This 
begs for renewed attention to both the causes and the consequences of these conflicts. 
Also non-violent political conflict remains an important factor in today’s world. Non-
violent political conflict refers to civil resistance campaigns against the political regime 
which are typically coordinated and organized by activists, public figures or civilians 
(Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Non-violent conflict is different from armed conflict to the 
extent that non-violent conflict per definition excludes actions that have a violent nature, 
but they are similar to the extent that in both conflicts the government or state is involved. 
In addition, not unlike armed conflict, non-violent conflicts are a major source of political 
instability, regularly leading to the replacement of a regime and a transition to democracy 
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). When non-violent resistance fails, opposition groups often 
use this as a justification to escalate to civil war (Regan & Norton, 2005). To a large extent 
the early Arab Spring protests could be classified as non-violent conflict, leading to 
successful democratization in Tunisia but also major violent conflicts in Syria, Libya and 
Yemen. In Figure 1.2 we depict the change in demonstrations and strikes, two prominent 
non-violent conflict events, over the 2004 to 2014 period. There is a large increase from 
2011 onwards, which is partly due to the Arab Spring.  
Figure 1.2 The number of demonstrations relative to the frequency of armed conflict over 
2000-2015. 
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1.1.2 Multinational investment in conflict zones 
A firm becomes an multinational (MNE) – a firm present in more than one country - by 
undertaking Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Barba Navaretti & Venables, 2004). FDI is 
a flow of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of 
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
Compared to short-term credits and portfolio investments, FDI signals a long-lasting 
commitment. As a result, there is less of a risk of divestment if economic conditions 
deteriorate or investors’ perception of a country’s prospects change, reducing the risk of 
sudden capital flight. In addition, FDI is associated with several positive effects on the host 
economy, including transfer of technology and managerial know-how, formation of 
capital, creation of employment and better access to international markets (Jensen, 
Biglaiser & Li, 2012). It is therefore not surprising that many developing countries try to 
attract FDI. According to the World Bank (2017), developing countries received on 
average FDI inflows amounting to 2.4% of their GDP, while FDI inflows to developed 
nations equaled only 3.1% of GDP in 2015.  
Trade economists and international business scholars (IB) have extensively analysed how 
political risk2 - most notably risks related to expropriation and corruption - can explain 
variation in the distribution of FDI flows. They have reached a general consensus that 
political risk negatively affects these flows, although the effect is clearly heterogeneous 
across firms and depends among other things on the sector in which they are active and the 
firm’s experience (e.g. Brouthers, Gao & McNicol, 2008; Brunetti & Weder, 1998; Burger 
et al., 2015; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; 
Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Henisz, 2000; Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010; Meon & Sekkat, 2012; Schneider & Frey, 1985).  
Political conflict is considerably less well understood. Political conflict, and armed conflict 
in particular, differs from political risk, because it leads to a direct destruction of physical 
and human capital and is less predictable. Yet, on the conceptual level there is a general 
consensus that also political conflict can be expected to increase the cost of doing business 
and accordingly reduce FDI flows, because setting up a subsidiary in a conflict country is 
associated with a high risk of bombardment of assets, disruptions in the supply chain, 
extreme volatility in currency value, disorder in the market system and violence against 
employees (Dai et al., 2013; Li & Vashchilko, 2010).  
Nevertheless, for a number of firms political violence might actually signal an investment 
opportunity. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) propose three reasons why some firms might 
profit from conflict. First, violent conflict can reduce the transparency required from firms. 
2 In this thesis political risk is defined as the risk that a government unexpectedly changes 
‘the rules of the game’ to which firms ought to adhere (Butler & Joaquin, 1998).  
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As such, firms might profit from unofficial activities, such as tax evasion. Guidolin and La 
Ferrara show that during the Angolan war (1975-2002) private investors were able to profit 
from unofficial business, since necessary institutional reforms were not implemented until 
as a result of the government’s ‘state of emergency’. Second, in times of conflict entry of 
new firms is limited, as companies that are less able to function in a risky environment are 
less likely to invest. Consequently, competition is less fierce, which can raise profits. 
Hence, companies that have a competitive advantage in operating in conflict countries can 
benefit considerably from war. Third, political violence can pressure governments to 
obtain revenues to finance military expeditions, security arrangements and rebuilding 
efforts. As a result, bargaining power might shift in the favor of foreign investors. 
Especially investors with the right connections might be able to secure very low corporate 
tax rates or obtain operating licenses for nominal fees.  
In line with these arguments, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that not all MNEs are 
deterred by conflict (Driffield, Crotty & Jones, 2012). For example, Eni SpA announced 
major investments in Egypt’s oil and gas industry during the Arab Spring (fDi Markets, 
2013). Likewise, a British company invested in petroleum facility in Syria after the 
outbreak of the civil war, while Chinese, Indian and Arab investors have major stakes in 
South Sudan’s oil fields. Not only MNEs active in the natural resource industry invest in 
countries marred by conflict, also manufacturing and services firms locate in such 
countries. For example, General Motors and Coca Cola announced expansions of their 
production facilities in Egypt during the midst of the Arab Spring and companies such as 
Volvo, Deloitte and the Citigroup invested in Iraq during the previous few years.  
These anecdotes are representative for a larger set of investments. In terms of value more 
than 13% of all greenfield FDI flowing to developing countries in the period from 2003-
2012 went to countries experiencing a political conflict with at least 25 battle-related 
deaths per year, and nearly 5% went to countries experiencing a war (fDi Markets, 2013). 
According to the World Bank (2017), FDI flows make up 3.9% of GDP of conflict-
afflicted economies over this time period. The study of FDI is particularly insightful, 
because it signals that the investing firm expects a new subsidiary in a conflict country to 
be profitable. Although conflict causes uncertainty and increases security costs, sustained 
FDI flows indicate that multinationals can flourish in this environment, possibly gaining a 
sustainable competitive advantage and obtaining great profits.  
1.2 MOTIVATION 
Although scholars in the fields of political science, economics and management have paid 
considerable attention to the relationship between political conflict and FDI, the empirical 
results remain mixed (Table 1.1). One explanation for these mixed results is that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in how MNEs are affected by political conflict. Accordingly, 
the sample selection criteria could have a large impact on the findings. For example, if 
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MNEs in the manufacturing industry were to be more deterred by armed conflict than 
MNEs in the resource sector, I would find a particularly strong negative effect of conflict 
on FDI if I were to only include manufacturing investments. Or if only wars, i.e. armed 
conflicts that cause over 1,000 deaths, affect FDI, the results found depend to a large 
extent on whether I measure wars or armed conflict in general.  
In the International Business (IB) literature there have been some first explorations of the 
heterogeneous responses of MNEs to political conflict. These studies examine why some 
firms are more likely to invest in conflict areas than others. Driffield et al. (2012) find 
evidence that MNEs firms with more concentrated ownership and firms from home 
countries with relatively weak institutions are most likely to own a subsidiary in a conflict 
zone. Dai et al. (2013) analyse how political conflict affects exit decisions of Japanese 
MNEs and demonstrate that, contrary to expectations, geographically clustering with peers 
reduces firm survival in conflict zones. Using the same data, Dai et al. (2017) also find that 
subsidiaries’ exposure to political conflict increases exit rates, particularly for those 
subsidiaries that are most central in the firm’s network. Oh and Oetzel (2017) focus on the 
role of experience and show that only country-specific experience about how the 
government deals with insurgents reduces a subsidiary’s sensitivity to armed conflict.  
Nevertheless, there is much unknown about what drives MNEs to conflict areas. The 
challenges posed by the increase in violent conflict require a greater understanding of how 
firms react to periods of unrest. Such an understanding is needed to improve regulations 
and possibly create public-private partnerships. The Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) adopted by the UN General Assembly (2015) explicitly recognize the importance 
of peace and the role of partnerships in two separate goals: Peace, justice and strong 
institutions (SDG16) and partnerships for the goals (SDG17). The introduction of the 
SDGs has been followed by calls for more research on these topics (Kolk, Kourula & 
Pisani, 2017; Witte & Dilyard, 2017). Kolk et al. (2017) note: “[The lack of IB research on 
peace] is all the more remarkable as ‘business for peace’ and ‘peace through commerce’ 
(terms often used interchangeably) have given risen to a multidisciplinary body of work. 
This is thus another area that deserves further research attention.” Hence, whilst it 
impossible to open a newspaper without being faced with the terrible consequences of 
armed conflict and whilst there is ample anecdotal evidence that despite conflict commerce 
goes on, little is still known about multinational investment in this increasingly conflict-
afflicted world. 
 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
1.3.1 Political conflict, FDI and prosperity 
In my dissertation I address the relationships between political conflict, FDI and 
prosperity. The triangle in Figure 1.3 schematically shows the three concepts and their 
interrelationships. Political conflict (Figure 1.3, top box) has two components. Whereas 
violent conflict, most notably civil war and to a lesser extent international conflicts, might 
be the most salient types of political conflict, in my dissertation I also pay attention to civil 
resistance, the non-violent counterpart of armed conflict. In terms of FDI (Figure 1.3, 
bottom left), I move beyond whether FDI flows are on the whole affected by political 
conflict and will focus on different sources of heterogeneity that affect how FDI flows 
react to political conflict. These sources of heterogeneity include sector, firm and home 
country characteristics. The final concept in the triangle is prosperity (Figure 1.3, bottom 
right), which focuses on healthy societies and thriving citizens. Prosperity could hence be 
regarded as the ultimate life goal. Whereas prosperity is often seen as a synonym for 
economic development, I am particularly concerned with the relationship with subjective 
wellbeing (i.e. citizen’s happiness).  
Figure 1.3 Illustration of the hypothesized political conflict, FDI and prosperity triangle. 
The solid lines represent the relations studied in this dissertation, while the dashed lines 
correspond to relations established in the literature. The numbers indicate the chapters of 
this dissertation in which the relationship is discussed. 
The relationships between the concepts in Figure 1.3 are depicted by arrows. The two solid 
arrows are addressed in this dissertation, whereas the dashed arrows between FDI and 
prosperity depict a relationship that has received considerable scholarly attention before 
and is hence not analyzed in the following chapters. That is not to say, that there is 
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consensus on the relationship between these two concepts. As depicted in Figure 1.3, the 
relationship goes two ways with FDI - and particularly the market-seeking kind - being 
attracted to flourishing markets and FDI also been thought to benefit the domestic 
economy by creating knowledge spillovers for domestic firms (Borensztein, De Gregorio 
& Lee, 1998; Javorcik, 2004; Newman, Rand, Talbot & Tarp, 2015). This makes it 
troublesome to identify the direction of the relationship and hence, skepticism about the 
existence of these relationships remains. This is exemplified by the current anti-
globalization movement (e.g. Brexit, Trump’s election), that questions the benefits that 
multinationals bring to a host economy (Economist, 2017).   
The three chapters in this dissertation address the relationships depicted by the two solid 
arrows in Figure 1.3. First, I analyze how changes in prosperity are related to non-violent 
conflict. The first task of my PhD project was to perform an extensive literature review on 
the political conflict literature. After all, to be able to explain how variations in conflict 
affects MNEs, it is necessary to understand how variation in conflict emerges (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2008; Reeb, Sakakibara & Mahmood, 2012). Although conflict scholars produced 
several insightful explanations of armed conflict (for an overview see Blattman & Miguel, 
2010), I was puzzled by the inability of many of their models to explain the non-violent 
conflicts that are to a large extent to blame for the instability and armed conflict at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Chapter 2 is aimed at filling this gap in the literature, whilst 
also providing the background information for the other two chapters in my dissertation.  
Chapter 3 and 4 look at the relationship between armed conflict and FDI, depicted by the 
left-hand side solid arrow in Figure 1.3. These chapters focus on why some firms are 
willing to invest in countries afflicted by armed conflict, whereas other would not even 
consider these locations. As such, these chapters shed light on what type of investment is 
attracted to conflict countries. In Chapter 3 I analyze variations in investment responses to 
political conflict on the basis of the type of conflict, characteristics of the sector and the 
MNE’s ability to diversify the risk. Chapter 4 looks at how political conflict moderates the 
effect of home-host ties on investment decisions. Can MNEs from a home country that has 
a historical connection with a host country benefit from the uncertainty created by conflict? 
Although this dissertation enhances theory on country risk in several ways, its main goal 
has not been to develop theory, but to improve our understanding of a phenomenon: the 
increase in political conflict in recent years and the large number of MNEs that choose to 
operate in challenging environments. As such, it takes a more solution-oriented approach, 
inspired by the literature on ‘grand challenges’ (Buckley, Doh & Benischke, 2017; Watts, 
2017). Rather than developing theory for the sake of ‘making a theoretical contribution’3, 
we enhance theory with the aim of answering two pressing questions: 
3 For a discussion of management’s devotion to theory see Hambrick (2007). 
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(1) Can we explain and predict non-violent conflicts like those during the Arab
Spring?
(2) Why would multinationals be willing to invest in countries afflicted by
conflict?
1.3.2 Economics and IB: A happy marriage? 
The topic of this thesis is interdisciplinary; grand challenges like political conflict do not 
adhere to disciplinary boundaries (Buckley, Doh & Benischke, 2017). Political conflict is 
studied by political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, business scholars and 
economists, while FDI is studied by economists and business scholars. In line with 
Beugelsdijk et al.’s (2010) call for a more interdisciplinary approach to MNEs’ location 
choice, this research project takes place on the interface between economics and business. 
This interdisciplinary approach was partly intended at the outset of this project, and has 
partly been due to a shift in my interests from development economics to IB. Whilst 
Chapter 2 is primarily written for an audience of (development) economists, Chapter 3 and 
4 are targeted at the IB community. Chapter 2 provides recommendations to government 
agencies, whereas in Chapter 3 and 4 I also discuss implications for managers of 
multinationals.  
Notwithstanding the praise given to interdisciplinary research in social science and IB in 
particular (e.g. Cheng, Henisz, Roth & Swaminathan, 2009; Buckley, Doh & Benischke, 
2017; Watts, 2017), I have learned that doing interdisciplinary research is hard and getting 
it published is even harder. I felt an economist when at an IB conference and a 
management scholar at an economics conference. The two disciplines speak different 
languages and there were times that I felt neither was my native language. Over time, I 
started to identify more as an IB scholar and, fortunately, I got the one of the chapters in 
this dissertation published in an IB journal. Although most economics-inspired elements 
were replaced with their management counterparts during the review process, the 
methodology kept its economics flavor. In all three chapters the statistical tests and models 
(e.g. 2SLS, GMM models, LSDVC and mixed logit) are inspired by my background in 
economics. Even if real interdisciplinary research is difficult, a crossover in methods is 
feasible and valuable. In my fifth chapter I conclude my dissertation with some directions 
for future research. Here I also return to how economists and IB scholars can cooperate to 
work on topics related to ‘grand challenges’.   
1.3.3 Findings per chapter 
Chapter 2: Unhappy Rebels: The Role of Subjective Wellbeing in Civil Uprisings 
Motivated by the inability of existing models of grievances – which mainly rely on 
traditional socioeconomic indicators - to explain and predict the recent wave of political 
conflicts, we test whether wellbeing data can be used to better explain variation in these 
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events. We focus on non-violent civil conflict and construct a database combining data on 
non-violent uprisings and subjective wellbeing covering 118 countries over the period 
2007 to 2014. Consistent with the grievance-based approach to rebellion, we find that a 
decrease in average subjective wellbeing – and particularly an increase in self-reported 
suffering – leads to an increase in non-violent uprisings, but not violent political conflict. 
We find evidence that this negative effect of overall wellbeing on non-violent uprisings is 
to a large extent the result of changes to satisfaction with living standards and the 
perceived capability to have a purposeful and meaningful life.  
Chapter 3 Dodging Bullets: The Heterogeneous Effect of Political Violence on Greenfield 
FDI 
The relationship between political violence and greenfield foreign direct investment is 
contingent on the type of violence, the characteristics of the investment-receiving sector, 
and the international scope of the investing firm. Analysis with a dynamic fixed effects 
model for a panel of 90 developing countries shows that nationwide political conflict is 
negatively associated with total and non-resource-related greenfield FDI, but not with 
resource-related greenfield FDI. The insensitivity of resource FDI to political conflict is 
explained by the high profitability of natural resource extraction and geographic 
constraints on location choice. In the non-resource sector, the least geographically 
diversified firms are most sensitive to conflict. Other types of political violence, including 
intermittent violence in the form of terrorist acts and assassinations, or persistent but low-
impact events, such as political terror, have no effect on the location choice decisions of 
multinational enterprises. These findings inform the strategies of multinationals with a 
nuanced and much needed understanding of the effects of political violence and the risks it 
poses to their businesses. 
Chapter 4 When political instability destroys historical ties 
Although institutional and cultural distance evolve slowly, historical home-host ties can 
swiftly wear away as a result of political shocks. We investigate how shocks related to 
political instability, i.e. armed conflict and regime changes, affect the importance of 
historical ties for location choices of multinational enterprises (MNEs). We exploit firm-
level variation in a unique dataset comprised of FDI flows to all low income countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa from 2003 to 2013 and estimate a mixed logit model. The results show 
that violent conflict eliminates the positive effect of colonial relationships on the 
probability of MNE investment. This effect is confined to large conflicts where the 
probability of government takeover is largest. We also find that regime transitions erode 
the positive effect of colonial relationships on MNE location decisions. This implies that 
MNEs originating from a country with historical ties to the host country face incentives to 
prevent political shocks, whereas MNEs from countries without such home-host ties might 
actually benefit from threats to the status-quo. 
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1.4 INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
For all chapters in this dissertation, I am the leading author and have been responsible for 
most of the literature review, data collection, analyses and writing. I have done the work 
for the introduction (Chapter 1) and the conclusion and discussion (Chapter 5) 
independently, although I received valuable feedback from my promotor prof. Harry 
Commandeur. 
The idea of Chapter 2 on unhappy rebels resulted from discussions with my co-authors on 
this paper, Dr. Elena Ianchovichina and Dr. Martijn Burger, while we were working on a 
World Bank policy brief on the Arab Spring in Washington DC. Hence, all three of us 
have contributed to the research idea and conceptual framework. I have been responsible 
for the writing, the data collection and analyses, although I have received some support 
from my supervisor Martijn Burger with the GMM estimations presented in this chapter. 
Martijn Burger, who is an expert in subjective wellbeing research, also assisted with the 
literature analyses and formulating the contribution of the paper. Elena Ianchovichina 
provided the data on non-violent uprisings, gave suggestions for sensitivity analyses and 
assisted in presenting and contextualizing our findings. 
Of the chapters in this dissertation, Chapter 3 ‘Dodging bullets’ required most time and 
efforts. The co-authors on this paper, Dr. Martijn Burger, Dr. Elena Ianchovichina and 
Prof. Enrico Pennings, contributed during different stages of development of the paper. 
Martijn Burger was mainly involved in the first stages, including the formulation of the 
initial research idea, the formulation of the hypotheses and the first analyses. Elena 
Ianchovichina helped address concerns in the data analyses and contextualize our findings. 
She has also been a great help in the writing process, particularly in structuring and 
framing the study. Enrico Pennings, the only co-author that published in IB journals 
before, has been invaluable in terms of theory development and addressing the comments 
of referees. I am also grateful for the constructive comments by Journal of International 
Business editor, Mona Makhija, and three anonymous referees. Early versions of this paper 
were presented at the Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) Conference 2015 
and the 2015 AIB Annual Meeting in Bangalore. I would also like to thank seminar 
participants at Ivey Business School, Copenhagen Business School, the University of 
Groningen and the Erasmus School of Economics for their useful suggestions. 
For Chapter 4 on historical ties I came up with the research idea and conceptualized the 
study independently. I received useful feedback from my supervisors Martijn Burger and 
Enrico Pennings, particularly in terms of methodology and framing of the study. I am also 
grateful for the feedback received at the European Trade Study Group (2015) in Paris, the 
World Bank lunch seminar (2017) in Washington DC and the Annual Meeting of the 
Association of International Business (2017) in Dubai.  
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 Chapter 3 
Dodging Bullets: The 
Heterogeneous Effect of 
Political Violence on 
Greenfield FDI15 
 
ABSTRACT 
The relationship between political violence and greenfield foreign direct investment is 
contingent on the type of violence, the characteristics of the investment-receiving sector, 
and the international scope of the investing firm. Analysis with a dynamic fixed effects 
model for a panel of 90 developing countries shows that nationwide political conflict is 
negatively associated with total and non-resource-related greenfield FDI, but not with 
resource-related greenfield FDI. The insensitivity of resource FDI to political conflict is 
explained by the high profitability of natural resource extraction and geographic 
constraints on location choice. In the non-resource sector, the least geographically 
diversified firms are most sensitive to conflict. Other types of political violence, including 
intermittent violence in the form of terrorist acts and assassinations, or persistent but low-
impact events, such as political terror, have no effect on the location choice decisions of 
multinational enterprises. These findings inform the strategies of multinationals with a 
nuanced and much needed understanding of the effects of political violence and the risks it 
poses to their businesses. 
 
                                                 
15 Published as Witte, C. T., Burger, M. J., Ianchovichina, E. I., & Pennings, E. (2016). 
Dodging bullets: the heterogeneous effect of political violence on greenfield FDI. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 48(7), 862-892. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although research on business in emerging and developing economies has flourished over 
the last decade (Meyer & Peng, 2016), there has been relatively little focus on the effect of 
political violence on multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy. This lack of attention is 
surprising because in terms of value more than 13% of all greenfield investments flowing 
to developing countries in the period from 2003-2012 went to countries experiencing a 
political conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, and nearly 5% went to 
countries experiencing a war (fDi Markets, 2013). Recent research on the topic 
acknowledges that many MNEs own subsidiaries in areas prone to political conflict and 
focuses on how firms can meet the challenges posed by this threat. Oetzel and Getz (2012) 
study how stakeholders affect the tactics MNEs use to strategically respond to conflict, 
whereas Bader and Schuster (2015) focus on the role of networks to eliminate the negative 
effect of terrorist threats on the wellbeing of expatriates. However, few studies explore the 
mechanisms that attract MNEs to these fragile states in the first place (Czinkota, Knight, 
Liesch & Steen, 2010; Driffield, Crotty & Jones, 2013).  
Whereas the reasons for MNEs’ entry into areas marred by political violence remain 
largely unknown, a considerable number of studies published in International Business 
(IB) and political economy journals have tried to answer the question of whether total 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are in the least affected by political violence. On a 
conceptual level, scholars tend to agree that political violence has a detrimental effect on 
expected returns, reducing the propensity to invest. Nevertheless, the empirical results 
remain inconclusive. Nigh (1985) establishes that political violence in developing 
countries has a negative effect on U.S. manufacturing FDI, and Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2008) show that terrorism has a large negative effect on inward FDI flows relative to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Asiedu (2006) finds that in African countries, the number 
of coups, riots, and assassinations is negatively associated with the ratio of net FDI flows 
to GDP. However, in an earlier paper on the determinants of FDI in developing countries, 
she infers that the average number of assassinations and revolutions does not significantly 
influence FDI inflows (Asiedu, 2002). Li (2006) also concludes that the occurrence of 
unanticipated interstate wars has a negative influence on FDI, but he finds no significant 
association between FDI and intrastate wars or terrorist incidents, which represent most of 
the political violence incidents since the end of the Cold War (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 
2015). In contrast to Li (2006), Busse and Hefeker (2007) find that civil war negatively 
affects FDI, whereas interstate war has no effect on FDI. Several other scholars find no 
relationship between political violence and FDI (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007; Li & 
Vashchilko, 2010; Oetzel & Oh, 2014), whereas Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) and 
Asiedu and Lien (2011) find a positive relationship between FDI and conflict.  
There are several explanations for these heterogeneous and seemingly contradictory 
findings in the literature on political violence and FDI. First, the relationship between 
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political violence and FDI is contingent upon the type of violence. Building on the 
literature classifying different types of risk (Miller, 1992; Oetzel & Oh, 2014), we develop 
the argument that the effect of political violence depends upon the extent to which violence 
poses a continuous risk to business activities. Risk is considered to be continuous if it is 
persistent and foreseeable, whereas discontinuous risk refers to events that are episodic and 
difficult to anticipate (Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Ramanujam, 2003). In contrast to Oetzel and 
Oh (2014), we conceptualize country risk as a continuum on which, at one end, persistent 
risks such as corruption and expropriation risk are continuous risks; and at the other end, 
less-predictable hazards, for example, terrorist attacks, pose discontinuous risks to MNEs. 
Political conflict falls in the middle; it is less predictable and persistent than corruption but 
more continuous than terrorism. Following Li (2006), we argue that a certain level of 
predictability is required for firms to adjust their location choice process; hence, only the 
types of violence that pose a relatively continuous risk may affect firm’s location choice 
strategies. In addition, the geography of political violence matters because political 
conflicts that are geographically concentrated or localized in one part of the country are 
likely to pose less risk to an MNE investing in this country than political conflicts that are 
non-localized and are instead spread throughout the country. 
Second, the relationship between political violence and FDI depends upon characteristics 
of the FDI-receiving industry as well as firm-level attributes. Industries differ in the degree 
to which investments yield economic rents. When expected returns are high, MNEs are 
willing to take additional risk to capture these rents and are hence more likely to invest in 
countries affected by political violence. Moreover, sectors differ in terms of geographic 
constraints on investment activity due to the availability of resources only in certain 
locations. Particularly when resources or inputs are scarce, the presence of limited 
investment opportunities might result in the insensitivity of FDI to political violence. In 
this paper, we test whether these mechanisms drive MNEs to conflict areas using data from 
the natural resource industry, a sector in which rents can be exceptionally high and 
location choice is significantly restricted. Finally, the ability of the MNE to diversify or 
absorb the potential downward shock of political violence moderates the relationship 
between political conflict and FDI. Geographically diversified MNEs are considerably less 
affected by political violence than relatively undiversified MNEs, present in only a small 
number of countries.  
This paper is linked to the extensive literature on FDI and external sources of risk, notably 
political violence (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Dai, Eden & Beamish, 2003; 2016; 
Driffield et al., 2013; Li & Vashchilko, 2010; Oh & Oetzel, 2017) and political institutions 
(e.g., Burger, Ianchovichina, & Rijkers, 2016; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2003; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 2009; Peng, 
Wang & Jiang, 2008). It builds on the work of Burger et al. (2016), who analyze sectoral 
heterogeneity with respect to the relationship between political risk and FDI in the Arab 
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World before and during the Arab Spring. We extend the analysis to a set of 90 developing 
countries. Developed economies are excluded because political violence is foremost a 
developing country phenomenon (see Figure 3.1). In contrast to Burger et al. (2016), who 
focus on political instability, this study explores the effects of political violence, defined as 
‘collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – 
including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies’ (Gurr, 1970, 
p. 3-4). Instances of political violence include civil wars, territorial disputes, acts of 
terrorism and genocides; cases of criminal behavior are not considered political violence 
(Kalyvas, 2013). Thus, political violence differs from political instability, which merely 
focuses on the probability of a regime change. The risk posed by political violence is also 
different from political risk, because, whereas political risk poses a relatively continuous 
risk, political violence is more discontinuous. In addition, political risk is generally 
conceptualized as uncertainty about government policy, which affects MNEs indirectly, 
whereas political violence is foremost associated with the direct effect of capital 
destruction. Instead of considering political violence as one homogeneous category, we 
study the different manifestations of political violence (political conflict, terrorism, state 
terror, and assassination) separately, recognizing the complex nature of the phenomenon.  
 
Figure 3.1 Pie charts depicting the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks (START, 
2015) (left-hand side) and conflict (UCDP/PRIO, 2015) (right-hand side) for the period 
2003-2012 
In addition, this article relates to the literature on the strategy tripod perspective (Peng, 
Wang & Jiang, 2008; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009). Since the conception of the 
institution-based view of international strategy that, combined with the resource-based 
view and the industry approach, forms the tripod of strategy, several studies have focused 
on the effect of institutions on international strategy and the interaction with the resource-
based view (e.g. Darendelli & Hill, 2016; Goerzen, Sapp & Delios, 2010; Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010). Yet, this literature largely overlooks the interrelations with the industry-
based view – a significant gap given the evidence that the sector in which an MNE 
operates matters for its location choice decisions in countries with weak institutions 
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(Burger et al., 2016; Driffield et al., 2013; Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Ramos & 
Ashby, 2013; Schotter & Beamish, 2013). Nevertheless, theory on the mechanisms that 
explains these heterogeneous effects is lacking.  Building on the existing literature, we 
identify the underlying mechanisms that differentiate sectors and analyze the interrelations 
between industry-level mechanisms and the other two legs of the strategy tripod.  
We also contribute to the existing IB and economic geography literature by developing 
theory that uncovers the mechanisms behind the heterogeneous relationship between 
political violence and FDI, testing several hypotheses that help explain the mixed results of 
previous studies. In our study, we bring together the notions of space, place, and 
organization, a previously identified and emerging topic in IB (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). 
We incorporate the spatial context in three different ways. First, we consider the 
geographic scope of political violence, arguing that the effect of violence on inward FDI 
depends critically upon the extent to which firms can opt for a location in which the risk of 
attacks is minimized. Second, we develop the concept of geographical constraints on 
location choice, referring to the limitations on the location choice process resulting from 
requirements for inputs, which are exclusive, specific and irregularly dispersed across 
space, and we show that these constraints can moderate the effect of risk on location 
choice. Third, we show that the ability to absorb discontinuous risk depends on the 
geographic diversification of a firm.  
In our study, we establish that there is considerable heterogeneity in MNEs’ investment 
responses to political conflict in developing countries. This heterogeneity reflects 
differences in the type of violence, industry characteristics, notably the existence of rents 
and geographic constraints on location choice, and differences in the extent of a 
multinational’s geographic diversification. We find empirical evidence that conflicts have 
a negative effect on FDI in manufacturing and services but no effect on resource-related 
FDI; this finding holds for nationwide conflicts and not for localized conflicts. Finally, we 
show that the negative effect of conflict on total greenfield FDI stems from the sensitivity 
of relatively undiversified MNEs’ to political conflict. Most other types of political 
violence have no effect on any type of greenfield FDI. 
These findings inform the strategies of MNEs with a nuanced and much needed 
understanding of the effects of political violence and the risks it poses to their businesses 
in the context of a significant rise in the incidence of politically violent events around the 
world in recent years (Ianchovichina, 2016). Building on the work by Ramanujam (2003) 
and Oh and Oetzel (2017), we show that the continuity of the risk posed by political 
violence is an important factor influencing MNEs’ entry strategy into developing countries 
marred by political violence. Other factors that influence an MNE’s sensitivity to risk 
include sector characteristics, the MNE’s exposure to violence, and the ability of firms to 
diversify risk. Finally, our results suggest that political violence does not necessarily 
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depress earnings and put off investors; thinking otherwise is too simplistic. The paper 
shows that for geographically diversified MNEs entering a country in conflict may even be 
profitable.  
Several policy implications emerge from this analysis. First, because conflict-related risks 
vary by sector and conflict type, it is imperative to collect and examine disaggregated 
greenfield investment and conflict data when analyzing FDI in fragile developing 
countries. Second, institutions offering investment guarantees must recognize the 
differential exposure and sensitivity of MNEs to conflict when pricing risk. Third, FDI to 
resource-rich, conflict-affected countries can hamper rather than facilitate countries’ 
efforts to escape the conflict-resource trap. FDI flows to fragile countries are mostly 
financing resource projects, deepening resource dependence and thus threatening prospects 
for successful peace building (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Hence, the efforts of fragile 
developing countries to diversify and attract FDI into manufacturing and services sectors 
has to be accompanied by efforts to improve political stability, governance, transparency, 
and institutional quality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the previous 
literature, a theoretical framework building on the risk and economic geography literature, 
and several hypotheses. Section 3 presents the econometric framework and the data. 
Section 4 discusses estimation issues, the main empirical results, and additional analysis 
exploring the robustness of the results. This section also discusses the mechanisms at play 
in the case of the oil and gas sector. Section 5 provides a summary of findings and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A large strand of the IB and economics literature has analyzed the role of risk in 
internationalization decisions (e.g., Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Kogut & Chang, 1996; 
Pennings & Sleuwaegen, 2004; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Most of the theory explaining and 
classifying risk and uncertainty can be traced back to the work of Frank Knight (1921). 
According to Knight, risk applies to situations in which an informed agent can make a 
reasonable judgment on the probability of the event occurring; as such, risk differs from 
pure uncertainty in which these probabilities are unknown. Miller (1992) distinguishes 
three main sources of business risk: the general environment, the industry, and the firm 
itself. A large body of literature is focused on one specific type of environmental risk, 
namely political risk (e.g., Brunetti & Weder, 1998; Burger et al., 2016; Darandeli & Hill, 
2016; Henisz, 2000; Kobrin, 1979; Miller, 1992; Schneider & Frey, 1985). Although 
several definitions of political risk exist (Kobrin, 1979), the concept is most often defined 
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as the risk that a sovereign government might change ‘the rules of the game’ to which 
firms ought to adhere (Butler & Joaquin, 1998).  
The IB literature has traditionally analyzed the effect of three types of political risk on 
multinationals’ location choice decisions: corruption (Brouthers, Gao & McNicol, 2008; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), absence of political constraints 
(García-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Henisz, 2000; Holburn & Zelner, 2010) and expropriation 
risk (Duanmu, 2014; Kobrin, 1984). The average effect of all three types of political risk 
on FDI is consistently found to be negative, although large differences exist depending 
upon the resources available to the firm. For example, Holburn and Zelner (2010) find that 
the effect of weak constitutional constraints on MNEs’ location choice is dependent upon 
whether the multinational acquired relevant political capabilities in its home environment, 
whereas Duanmu (2014) demonstrates that the strength of the home country’s political 
influence can moderate the effect of expropriation risk on FDI. Finally, Goerzen, Sapp and 
Delios (2010) show that experience in the host country positively affects the returns to FDI 
in environments with high political risk.  
Similar to the studies mentioned above, we focus on risk deriving from the environment, 
specifically, the level of risk resulting from political violence. This risk is closely related to 
political risk because it also leads to ambiguity concerning government policy. During 
episodes of major political violence, a host government is more likely to change existing 
regulations or unexpectedly impose new ones, thus raising the cost of doing business once 
the MNE enters a market and incurs sunk costs (Li, 2006). These regulatory changes can 
include breach of contract, limiting repatriation of profits, exchange controls, embargoes, 
and other restrictive trade policies (Li & Vashchilko, 2010). However, political risk is 
different from political violence because political violence can also lead to extensive 
destruction of both human and physical capital due to fighting between government and 
rebel groups, or terror acts (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2008). In addition, whereas corruption, 
expropriation risk and political constraints are generally persistent over time, political 
violence can consist of singular incidents or short episodes of conflict, making it more 
difficult to predict accurately than other forms of political risk.16 For example, few 
predicted the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010 (Gausse, 2011).  
The above discussion links to the distinction between risk and uncertainty in which the 
difference between the two concepts is whether the probability of an event occurring is 
known. Because it is unlikely that managers know the exact probabilities with which 
political violence affects their business activities, it seems straightforward to conclude that 
political violence generates uncertainty instead of risk. However, in reality, managers 
                                                 
16 The literature on the determinants of political violence also remains inconclusive (for an 
overview see Blattman & Miguel, 2010).  
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attempt to approximate the odds of such events (albeit with a margin of error) and, when 
doing so, they inevitably convert uncertainty into risk. Still, their ability to convert 
uncertainty into risk depends largely on the process underlying the risk. Discontinuous risk 
of infrequent and episodic events is closer to pure uncertainty than continuous, Knightian 
risk of predictable events. The distinction between these two types of risk was made by 
Oetzel and Oh (2014), who built on the work by Ramanujam (2003). Following this 
distinction, political violence poses a more discontinuous risk than do most forms of 
political risk; hence, the occurrence of political violence confers less information about the 
event reoccurring.  
The Multiple Facets of Political Violence and FDI 
Although political violence can pose large risks to subsidiaries, the results of empirical 
inquiries into the relationship between FDI and political violence are inconsistent (Asiedu, 
2011; Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007; Dai et al., 2013; Driffield et al., 2013). A plausible 
explanation for these inconsistent findings is that the effect depends upon the type of 
political violence. Different types of violence (e.g., terrorism, conflict, and assassinations) 
not only have different effects on business activities but also differ in terms of the nature of 
the risk they pose. Following Oetzel and Oh’s (2014) distinction between continuous and 
discontinuous risk, we recognize that (i) political violence poses a less continuous risk than 
do some types of political risk, such as corruption or the lack of constitutional constraints; 
and (ii) within the category of political violence, there remains substantial heterogeneity in 
terms of risk continuity. Whereas Oetzel and Oh (2014) presume that the effects of 
continuous and discontinuous risk are similar, we argue otherwise. In the case of a 
discontinuous risk, the event occurring does not directly affect the probability of 
reoccurrence; therefore, it most likely hardly affects risk assessment and ultimately 
location choice strategy.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates our classification of political violence based on two dimensions: the 
continuity of the political risk and its level of impact on the MNE’s operations. Both high 
level of impact and high degree of risk continuity are necessary conditions for political 
violence to affect location choice. First, we recognize that the impact of political violence 
must be high to affect location choice. Political conflicts (e.g. international wars and civil 
conflict) and terrorism,17 placed in the right-side panel of Figure 3.2, are high-impact 
events. They can lead to significant negative shocks to earnings because of property 
damage, death and injury of employees, destruction of required infrastructure, disruptions 
in the supply chain, and an increase in the cost of trade (Bodea & Elbadaw, 2008; Li & 
Vashchilko, 2010; Oh & Oetzel, 2017). Moreover, because of nationalistic sentiments, 
                                                 
17 Terrorism is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a 
political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation (LaFree 
& Dugam, 2007). 
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consumers might be reluctant to purchase products from a foreign firm, if it is a subsidiary 
of a company located in a country hostile to the host. This reluctance reduces the expected 
profitability of a subsidiary, particularly in the case of market-seeking FDI. As a result, the 
pay-off to an investment in a conflict-affected country is subject to a large one-sided risk, 
making FDI into such countries less attractive.  
Political terror, defined as “violations of physical or personal integrity rights carried out 
by a state” (Wood & Gibney, 2010, p. 369), rarely directly affects an MNE’s earnings, 
although in rare cases, an MNE’s involvement in countries known for a lack of respect for 
human rights results in consumer boycotts in the home country (Driffield et al., 2013). 
Therefore, political terror is considered to be a relatively low impact event and it is placed 
in the left-side panel of Figure 3.2. Similarly, there is little reason to expect that political 
assassinations,18 affect an MNE’s investment decision as they have a limited effect on a 
subsidiary’s operations. Hence, this type of event also belongs in the left-side panel of 
Figure 3.2.  
 Type of impact  Level of impact 
 Type of risk Low High 
C
ontinuity 
Discontinuous/ 
Intermittent 
Assassinations  Terrorism 
Continuous Political Terror Political conflict (e.g., civil 
conflict or interstate war) 
Figure 3.2 Different types of political violence, organized by level of impact and continuity  
Second, the risk of political violence has to be relatively continuous to affect location 
choice. In other words, the underlying event needs to be fairly persistent and predictable. 
Assassinations can be characterized as discontinuous because they are irregular and almost 
by definition difficult to predict; the success of an assassination depends upon an element 
of surprise. Similarly, following Oetzel and Oh (2014), we characterize terrorism as a 
discontinuous risk because isolated incidents tend to be uncommon and non-persistent. 
Some countries are more prone to attract terrorists, but the actual occurrence of terrorism is 
difficult to anticipate, making this type of violence more discontinuous than political 
conflict and terror. Oetzel and Oh’s study also showed that a recent terrorist attack does 
not significantly affect the probability of entry, confirming our statement that a certain 
level of continuity is a necessary condition for political violence to have a direct effect on 
location choice strategies. Finally, political terror, placed in the bottom left corner of 
                                                 
18 Political assassinations are the murder or attempted murder of a high government official 
or politician with a political aim (Banks, 2015). 
 52 
 
Figure 2, poses continuous risk. This type of violence tends to be persistent and relatively 
predictable based on political trends, the quality of institutions, and the past prevalence of 
torture, extrajudicial killings, and political imprisonment.  
Political conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force occurs between two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state” by Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015, p. 1). War that 
causes at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year is a specific case of political conflict. 
Conflict poses a continuous risk due to its persistent properties and relatively predictable 
nature. Political leaders often reveal parts of their military strategy in speeches, electoral 
statements, or political manifests. Moreover, after the onset of a political conflict, a 
manager is likely to readjust the risk perception of an investment because the probability of 
future battles is high. In other words, the incidence of battles conveys information about 
the probability of their impact on business activities and hence enables an updated risk 
assessment. Given that political conflict poses a continuous risk and at the same time has a 
high level of impact, we expect that particularly this type of political violence is negatively 
associated with the location choice decisions of MNEs. Thus, in the remainder of this 
paper, we focus on political conflict and formulate our first hypothesis. 
H1: Total greenfield FDI flows in developing countries are negatively associated with 
political conflict. 
Conflict heterogeneity: Geographic Scope 
Type of political conflict   Geographic scope 
 Type of sector Localized/limited 
scope Nationwide/wide scope 
G
eographic 
constraints 
None Less sensitive More sensitive 
Severe Not sensitive Not sensitive 
Figure 3.3 MNE’s sensitivity to political conflict: geography considerations  
Although we expect that political conflict is negatively associated with FDI inflows, we 
also expect that this relationship is heterogeneous. The geographic scope of political 
conflict within a country can moderate the relationship between political conflict and FDI. 
Geographic scope refers to the extent to which the conflict is concentrated in one part of 
the country, where the scope is smallest in conflicts concentrated in only one province and 
largest in nationwide conflicts. In a subnational analysis, Dai et al. (2013) find that the 
likelihood of foreign subsidiaries’ survival is negatively associated with their geographic 
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exposure to conflict. Likewise, it can be expected that the sensitivity of MNEs to political 
conflict depends upon the extent to which they can limit their exposure to fighting. In 
countries affected by conflict with a relatively small scope, localized in one part of the 
country, MNEs can limit their exposure by locating elsewhere within the same country. 
This is not possible in countries marred by nationwide conflict. Therefore, a conflict with a 
small scope is likely to pose less risk to MNEs investing in a country than is violence with 
a large scope, prevalent in all areas of the country (Figure 3.3).  
In addition, the goals of rebels fighting in remote or geographically confined areas tend to 
be different from the goals of groups participating in nationwide conflicts. Buhaug and 
Gates (2002) showed that geographically contained conflicts are more likely than 
nationwide conflicts to concern a territorial incompatibility because separatist groups are 
often active in their area of interest, whereas nationwide conflicts often involve a party 
contesting the national government. The second type of conflict is more likely to lead to a 
change in government and hence create additional political risk. Consequently, we can 
formulate our second hypothesis.  
H2: The effect of a political conflict on total greenfield FDI flows to a developing country 
depends on the geographic scope of the conflict, so that total greenfield FDI flows are less 
sensitive to a localized than to a nationwide political conflict.  
Sector heterogeneity: geographic constraints and economic rents 
It is likely that the effect of political conflict on FDI is dependent upon industry 
characteristics (Driffield et al., 2013). We focus on two industry characteristics: 
geographic constraints on location choice and economic rents. First, FDI in some 
industries may be insensitive to political conflict because its set of location choices is 
restricted by requirements on inputs, which are exclusive, specific and irregularly 
dispersed across space (Figure 3.3). Only a limited number of locations can satisfy the 
criteria of an MNE that would like to invest abroad (Dunning & Narula, 2004; Narula & 
Bellak, 2009; Buckley et al., 2007; Mataloni Jr., 2011), particularly when the economic 
activities of the firm require high asset specificity (Burger et al., 2013). If assets are scarce 
and only available in a limited set of locations, MNEs face geographical constraints on 
their location choice. 
With geographic constraints on location choice, the acquisition of a first-mover advantage 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) increases in importance. First-mover advantages, 
defined as the advantage of firms investing first over those that invest later, can arise from 
three sources: technological leadership, buyer switching costs, and pre-emption of rivals’ 
acquisition of assets. Whereas technological leadership and, to a lesser extent, buyer 
switching costs are currently determined in increasingly global markets, first-mover 
advantages due to the acquisition of assets are specific to a geographical area. As a result, 
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location choice strategies play an important role in obtaining this type of advantage; this is 
particularly true for MNEs that are geographically constrained in their location choice. By 
being first in acquiring a license to operate in a location rich in scarce assets, the MNE 
preempts rival firms from accessing these assets (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), 
significantly affecting its profits. Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) show that if by investing a 
firm can obtain strategic advantages over its rivals, investing is the optimal action even 
when uncertainty is high. 
Natural resource MNEs are particularly dependent upon specific scarce assets; thus, they 
are geographically constrained in their location. These firms might invest in a location 
despite the presence of political conflict to secure access and acquire the rents associated 
with a first-mover advantage (Mason & Weeds, 2010; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004). As a 
result, MNEs active in the resource sector should be less sensitive to political conflict than 
MNEs in sectors in which location choice is less restricted. We refer to the effect of 
limited investment opportunities as the geographic-constraints mechanism.  
Second, FDI flows may not be sensitive to conflict if the returns on an investment are 
sufficiently high to counteract the negative effect of the increased risk associated with 
conflict. In this article, we focus on the natural-resource industry, in which returns to 
investment can be especially high in times of commodity booms (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). 
During resource booms, large rents increase the value of a project and hence increase the 
probability of investment despite high risk due to war. We refer to the effect of economic 
rents on the responsiveness of FDI to political conflict as the economic-rent mechanism. 
As the geographic-constraints and the economic-rent mechanisms are expected to be 
essential factors that differentiate the sensitivity of resource-related and non-resource-
related FDI to political conflict, we formulate our third hypothesis. 
H3: Resource-related greenfield FDI flows are less negatively associated with political 
conflict in developing countries than non-resource-related greenfield FDI flows. 
Sector heterogeneity: geographic scope of conflict 
The geographical constraints on location choice interact with the geographic scope of 
conflict (Figure 3.3). MNEs are constrained in their location choice by local resource 
availability, and not all locations are suitable for all types of investments because they lack 
the appropriate specialized location advantages (Mataloni Jr., 2011; Burger, Van der 
Knaap, & Wall, 2013). Particularly, for investments in the resource sector, the number of 
potential locations is limited given the very specific location requirements with respect to 
the presence of natural resources. If an MNE is limited in its location choice, it might not 
have the option to locate its subsidiaries away from political conflict, and we expect that 
the firm is not sensitive to conflict, irrespective of its geographic scope. Hence, firms 
active in the resource sector might be unable to locate their operations in a safe area that is 
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far away from a localized conflict, whereas MNEs active in non-resource industries might 
have several investment options within the same country and thus can choose a safer 
location. Therefore, in cases of localized conflict, resource MNEs might have fewer 
opportunities to circumvent areas where fighting is concentrated than firms that are less 
constrained in their location choices. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4: The moderating effect of the geographic scope of conflict is larger for non-resource-
related greenfield FDI flows than for resource-related greenfield FDI flows in developing 
countries. 
Firm heterogeneity: MNE’s ability to absorb risk through geographic diversification 
Political violence tends to be exogenous to actions of investors (Li, 2006). It poses a type 
of uncertainty that can only be resolved with the passage of time and hence there is limited 
room for subsidiaries to implement strategies reducing the level of political violence. In a 
firm-level analysis Oh and Oetzel (2017) confirm this, showing that (general) experience 
with political conflict does not influence MNEs investment response to new disasters; only 
country-specific experience with conflict risk reduces MNEs sensitivity to conflict. Garcia-
Canal and Guillén (2008) even found that firms that have invested in a high-risk economy 
in the past develop an aversion against entering countries with similarly high levels of risk.  
Nevertheless, whereas MNEs might have limited influence on the level of political 
violence they face, the impact of political violence on a firm’s internationalization strategy 
is likely to depend on firm-specific resources, particularly the firm’s ability to absorb and 
diversify risks. Rugman (1976) already demonstrated that in the case of imperfectly 
correlated national economic fluctuations an MNE faces less risk than a comparable firm 
selling goods in one market alone because the number of subsidiaries in the MNE’s 
portfolio reduces the variance of the overall portfolio of subsidiary results (Kogut & 
Kulatilaka, 1994). Several studies confirmed that geographic diversification improves 
firm’s risk-return performance (Kim, Hwang & Burgers, 1993; Qian, 1996; Qian & Li, 
1998). Following these findings, we expect that the degree of an MNE’s geographic 
diversification will reduce the negative effect of the risks posed by political violence on 
earnings.  
In addition, real options theory posits that geographic diversification confers firms the 
option to transfer production to another subsidiary in the case of unanticipated events 
(Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Lee & Makhija, 2009; Li & Rugman, 2007). Accordingly, 
MNEs present in a relatively large number of countries can minimize the effect of 
downside risks on earnings. Both the option value and the value of diversification are 
largest when unanticipated events are not globally correlated (Belderbos, Tong & Wu, 
2014). Because political violence tends to be limited to one or at most a few countries, this 
condition is typically satisfied. Hence, geographically diversified firms seem better able to 
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absorb risks posed by political conflict than relatively undiversified MNEs. Accordingly, 
we expected that conflict has a smaller effect on their expected earnings, increasing the 
probability that more diversified MNEs invest in countries characterized by a high conflict 
risk relative to less diversified MNEs. Finally, the most geographically diversified firms 
may be running out of opportunities to expand to highly attractive markets (Penrose, 
1959). Hence, they might be more willing to invest in high-risk environments than less 
diversified firms.19 Oetzel and Oh (2014) also find evidence that the impact of terrorism on 
FDI is moderated by international diversification, albeit using it merely as a control 
variable. We therefore hypothesize the following:  
H5: Greenfield FDI flows from more geographically diversified MNEs are less negatively 
associated with political conflict than greenfield FDI flows from less geographically 
diversified MNEs.  
 
3.3 METHODOLOGY & DATA 
Our economic model departs from the assumption that the decision to invest in a foreign 
subsidiary is a function of both expected returns and perceived uncertainty (e.g., Wheeler 
& Mody, 1992; Meon & Sekkat, 2012). Therefore, we assume that MNEs evaluate each 
investment opportunity individually and invest if the expected payoff exceeds a certain 
cutoff value. Hence, our model represents a positive sum economy in which an investment 
made in one country does not directly affect the amount of FDI in other territories. 
Guimaraes, Figueirdo and Woodward (2003) show that in models with only location-level 
determinants such as ours, the assumption behind the location decision does not directly 
affect results. We estimate the following sector-specific, reduced-form dynamic investment 
model: 
, (1) 
The model links the greenfield foreign direct investment, FDIist , flowing into country i in 
sector s in year t with a range of variables underpinning perceived uncertainty and 
expected returns. These variables include lagged FDI in sector s; political violence 
indicator Pi(t-1) for country i in the previous year; a set of control variables Xi(t-1), which 
capture conditions that might confound the relationship between political violence and 
                                                 
19 According to Penrose’s (1959) view of firm growth, MNEs expand internationally to 
utilize firm-specific assets that exhibit economies of scope. Compared to MNEs that 
already operate in many foreign locations, MNEs in the early stages of international 
expansion are likely to have more limited international expertise. Yet, they have greater 
expansion opportunities that are tightly linked with their existing resource base than MNEs 
that are already geographically diversified.  
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greenfield FDI; a set of country dummies μi for time-invariant country characteristics; and 
a vector of time dummies μt.  
The country fixed effects capture time-fixed heterogeneity, controlling for effects such as 
country size, resource endowments, culture, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, as well as 
institutions because institutions change very slowly over time. Moreover, the country fixed 
effects control for unobserved heterogeneity, limiting the risk of self-selection bias. We 
thus consider only within country variation, that is, whether a country attracts less FDI 
when its level of political violence increases. The time dummies capture time-dependent 
effects, such as global FDI waves, global commodity price fluctuations, and other global 
economic phenomena. The lagged FDIis variable minimizes the risk of omitted variable 
bias because the amount of FDI received in the previous period is one of the best 
predictors of FDI received in the subsequent period. In addition, this variable makes 
possible the estimation of the long-term effects of our variables. To reduce the problem of 
reverse causality, all independent variables are lagged. However, ultimately, this model 
cannot determine causality, so the results should be interpreted as conditional associations, 
not causal relationships.  
The data on flows of greenfield FDI into developing countries for the period from 2003 to 
2012 are obtained from the fDi Markets database, a Financial Times databank tracking 
cross-border investment in new projects and expansions of existing ventures. The data are 
collected through Financial Times newswires, internal information and other media 
sources, project data acquired from industry organizations and investment agencies, and 
data purchased from market research and publication companies. Each project is cross-
referenced against multiple sources. The dataset includes 51,800 greenfield investments in 
developing countries, amounting to US$ 4.62 trillion. Annual FDI inflows are aggregated 
to the sector level of the receiving country. To test hypotheses three and four, we split total 
FDI flows into resource-related flows, which include flows to hydrocarbons, minerals, and 
agriculture, and non-resource-related FDI flows, which include flows to manufacturing, 
construction, distribution, and commercial services. FDI flows are measured in millions of 
US dollars, and because the distribution of these flows is skewed, they are log-
transformed, using the logarithm of the inverse hyperbolic sine: ).  
We focus on greenfield investment because it consists of a relatively homogeneous group 
of investments in new facilities and excludes investments resulting from fire sales 
(Krugman, 2000). This focus eliminates concerns that heterogeneity of FDI is driving the 
results and the possibility that investment reflects repairs of facilities associated with prior 
investments rather than new projects. In developing countries, the inflow of greenfield 
investments is also considerably greater than the inflow of brownfield investments 
(Markusen & Stähler, 2011). A comparison of the number of greenfield investments in our 
dataset to all mergers and acquisitions (M&As) registered by the Thomson One data 
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service in the same period reveals that 81.6% were greenfield investments. Moreover, 
many policymakers are particularly interested in attracting greenfield FDI (UNCTAD, 
2013). Finally, data on greenfield investments are more detailed than data on M&As. 
Although the Thomson One data service includes information on M&As, the size of the 
investment is missing for approximately 50% of the observations in developing countries 
for the period under study.20  
Following the political science literature, we measure political conflict using the number of 
battle-related deaths (BRD) per year in a country. The data are obtained from the 
UCDP/PRIO Battle Related Death database (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015) and are 
gathered using information taken from a selection of publicly available sources, including 
journals, news agencies, NGO reports and statements of governments. The battle-related 
deaths variable is a best estimate, based on all information evaluated by UCDP/PRIO. The 
variable measures fatalities in conflict situations such as conventional battlefield fights, 
guerrilla attacks on government personnel, and bombardments of military bases, cities, and 
villages. It only includes battle-related deaths for conflicts with more than 25 battle-related 
deaths per year. Although this indicator has limitations – e.g., it does not measure non-fatal 
casualties or damage to property – it is widely available for conflict countries and is 
considered a good proxy for political violence. In addition, this variable is less likely to be 
endogenous to FDI than most subjective measures of conflict because MNE investments 
are unlikely to cause battle-related deaths directly. Because the battle-related deaths 
variable is highly skewed, we take the natural log of the inverse hyperbolic sine function.  
For our second and fourth hypothesis on the moderating effect of geographic scope of 
political conflict, we use again the UCDP/PRIO Battle Related Deaths dataset. 
UCDP/PRIO records the warring parties and the incompatibility of each conflict. The 
geographic scope variable is a dummy, which is 0 if a conflict is localized and 1 if a 
conflict is nationwide. First, we coded every secessionist conflict as localized because 
secessionist fighting is generally confined to the territory that is fought over (Buhaug & 
Gates, 2002). Subsequently, we manually checked whether conflicts, in which the 
incompatibility concerned the government instead of a regional territory, were nationwide 
by analyzing articles on the conflict on the website of BBC news and profiles of the 
insurgents on the START website (2014). Finally, we visually confirmed our coding using 
maps based on the UCDP/PRIO Georeferenced Event Database (Sundberg & Melander, 
2013) for all conflicts in Africa and South Asia. Unfortunately, UCDP/PRIO GED does 
not yet collect georeferenced data on conflicts on other continents. We found no 
                                                 
20 Some of the data on the size of investment are estimated by fDi Markets rather than 
directly observed. Therefore, we repeated our estimations with the number of projects (ln) 
as the dependent variable. The results were qualitatively the same as those reported here 
and are available from the authors on request.  
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inconsistencies in the coding based on the information provided by BBC News or START. 
We exclude the main effect of localized conflict from our regressions because the type of 
conflict is virtually country invariant and is hence absorbed by the country fixed effects in 
our regression.21 If a country experienced both a localized and non-localized conflict, we 
coded the observation as having experienced a nationwide conflict. In 22.4% of the 
observations, there is an ongoing conflict; of those, 56.6% are coded as localized.  
Although fDi Markets records FDI data on the project level, it does not include any 
information on the investing firm other than the name of the company and its parent 
company. We collected firm-level data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database, containing 
annual report data of over 79,000 companies worldwide, and manually matched these data 
to companies in the fDi Markets dataset. Nevertheless, 32.9% of all investment projects in 
fDi Markets could not be linked to companies in the Orbis dataset. We code 
geographically diversified firms using a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm has 
subsidiaries in at least 10 countries and zero otherwise.22 To facilitate the comparison of 
different models and to limit sample selection bias,23 we divide greenfield FDI into FDI by 
geographically diversified firms and FDI by other firms. Whereas we restrict the 
coefficients of our control variables to be fixed at the country-year level, the effect of 
political conflict and the constant are allowed to vary over the values of the diversification 
dummy. In the section containing our robustness analysis, we also present the results of a 
firm-level model.  
The data on our control variables come primarily from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators Database. We control for GDP given in millions of US$ in 2013 
prices; the size of the population; and inflation measured as the annual growth rate of the 
GDP implicit deflator. In addition, we add three variables that control for continuous 
political risk: the level of democracy; regulatory quality; and control of corruption. 
Democracy is measured by the Polity Index developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2002), 
which ranges from -10 to +10, where low negative numbers indicate autocracies and high 
positive numbers correspond to democracies. The quality of regulations indicator, part of 
the World Governance Index (WGI) (Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011), measures 
perceptions of a government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The control of corruption 
                                                 
21 Only Pakistan and Mali experienced both a localized and non-localized conflict.  
22 Firms that were not matched to firms registered by Orbis or firms for which no data were 
available on the number of employees were assumed to be small and hence undiversified. 
We also tested our hypotheses using other operationalizations of the diversification 
variable and obtained results that were qualitatively the same. These results are available 
from the authors on request.  
23 Data on firm-level variables other than multinationality were limited, even more so than 
the data on the geographic location of subsidiaries. 
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measure also comes from the WGI and measures the extent to which public officials use 
power for private gain. Both WGI variables are measured as a z-score varying from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
Furthermore, we control for nominal exchange rates (level and standard deviation24) using 
data collected through OANDA. Appendix 3.1 provides descriptive statistics and the 
correlation matrix. Appendix 3.2 shows a list of all countries included in the sample. 
3.4 ESTIMATION & EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Using a fixed effects estimator to estimate the dynamic model (1) presents a problem. In 
panels with a large number of countries but a small number of time periods, the standard 
fixed effects estimates are inconsistent because the transformation process creates a 
correlation between the regressor and the error (Nickell, 1981). We therefore use the bias 
corrected least-squares dummy variable dynamic panel estimator, also known as the 
LSDVC model, developed by Bun and Kiviet (2003) to correct for this Nickell bias, where 
a system GMM estimator initializes the bias correction. In a simulation, Flannery and 
Hankins (2013) compared the LSDVC model to other popular models designed to address 
dynamic panel data bias, including the popular system GMM model developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). They find that even in the case of moderate endogeneity and serial 
correlation, the LSDVC emerges as the most accurate methodology. We estimate dynamic 
model (1) separately for the resource and non-resource sectors and perform a Chow test 
(Chow, 1960) in order to test whether the coefficients in the resource and non-resource 
FDI estimations are statistically different from each other. The Chow test is designed to 
test whether the coefficients of a model estimated over one group are similar to those 
estimated in another group.   
In addition to analyzing the short-term effect of political violence on greenfield FDI 
inflows, we are also interested in the long-term effect, which is the total cumulative effect 
from year t until infinity. The dynamic panel model (1) makes it possible to identify the 
long-term equilibrium effect of political violence on greenfield FDI as follows:  
   (2) 
Results 
Table 3.1 shows the baseline results estimated using the Bun and Kiviet LSDVC estimator. 
We estimate six different specifications in which the dependent variable represents total 
greenfield FDI (columns 1 and 2), resource greenfield FDI (columns 3 and 4), and all other 
greenfield FDI, also referred to as non-resource FDI (columns 5 and 6).  
                                                 
24 Following the literature, exchange rate volatility is operationalized as the standard 
deviation of the first difference of the natural logarithm of daily bilateral exchange rates 
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. 
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Table 3.1 Effect of Political Violence on Total, Resource, and Non-resource Greenfield 
FDI 
 Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI (in USD millions), LSDVC Estimation 
 Total FDI Resource-Related FDI Non-Resource-Related FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BRDt-1 (ln) -0.095+ -0.111 0.009 0.046 -0.125* -0.225** 
 (0.052) (0.072) (0.074) (0.102) (0.051) (0.070) 
BRD (ln)*localizedt-1  0.033  -0.075  0.202* 
  (0.096)  (0.137)  (0.094) 
Greenfield FDIi, t-1 (ln) 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.095* 0.095* 0.119** 0.109* 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
GDPt-1 (ln) -0.427 -0.440 -1.484+ -1.461+ 0.126 0.061 
 (0.594) (0.597) (0.848) (0.851) (0.582) (0.583) 
Populationt-1 (ln) 8.696** 8.734** 14.547*** 14.528*** 6.432* 6.583* 
 (2.831) (2.838) (4.027) (4.035) (2.763) (2.759) 
WGI regulatory 
qualityt-1 -0.069 -0.084 1.616+ 1.655+ -0.819 -0.916 
 (0.647) (0.651) (0.925) (0.929) (0.635) (0.637) 
Polity Indext-1 0.006 0.002 0.014 0.022 -0.012 -0.033 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.070) (0.070) (0.048) (0.048) 
Exchange Ratet-1 (ln) -1.515+ -0.272 -1.447 -1.438 -0.893 -0.870 
 (0.783) (0.367) (1.024) (1.026) (0.741) (0.741) 
Exchange Rate 
Volatilityt-1 -24.344** -24.497** -12.680 -12.378 -12.606+ -13.489+ 
 (7.480) (7.476) (10.638) (10.626) (7.331) (7.317) 
Control of 
Corruptiont-1 1.495* 1.487* 0.784 0.804 1.306* 1.259* 
 (0.627) (0.629) (0.893) (0.896) (0.611) (0.612) 
Inflationt-1 -0.002 -0.002 0.011 0.011 0.001 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Long-term BRD (ln) -0.117* 0.137 0.010 0.051 -0.142* -0.253** 
 (0.065) (0.088) (0.083) (0.113) (0.059) (0.079) 
Observations 707 707 707 707 707 707 
Number of countries 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Political conflict proxied by battle-related deaths. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Battle-related deaths are negatively associated with total FDI flows, and the variable is 
significant at the 10% level. A 10% increase in the number of battle-related deaths 
decreases total greenfield FDI flows by approximately 0.95%, ceteris paribus. This effect 
is in addition to the decline in FDI stemming from worsening macroeconomic conditions 
and restrictions in investment policies; these additional effects are captured by the controls 
for changes in GDP, exchange rates, inflation, and the regulatory quality index. The long-
term effect of BRD on total greenfield FDI flows is slightly larger than the short-term 
effect. A 10% increase in BRD decreases greenfield FDI with 1.2%. We therefore find 
support for the first hypothesis (H1), namely that political conflict has a negative effect on 
total greenfield FDI. 
In the second specification, we take into account the geographic scope of conflict by 
adding a moderator for scope of conflict to the model. The coefficient of the moderator is 
positive and eliminates the negative effect of the main effect. However, the moderator is 
not significantly different from zero. Therefore, we find no support for our second 
hypothesis (H2) that the effect of political conflict on total FDI flows depends on the 
geographic scope of the conflict. The fact that the number of BRD in a localized conflict 
reflects more intense fighting than the same number of BRD in a nationwide conflict could 
offset the effect of the geographic scope of conflict on the relationship between conflict 
and FDI. This could explain why the scope of conflict moderator is not statistically 
significant.  
With respect to the control variables, the lagged FDI term is highly significant across both 
specifications. Exchange rate volatility and level are negatively associated with FDI flows. 
The effect is particularly strong for exchange rate volatility. Control of corruption and 
large population size are positively and significantly associated with FDI flows, whereas 
regulatory quality, level of democracy, inflation and GDP do not significantly affect FDI 
in any of the specifications, possibly because these variables vary little during the years 
covered by our sample.  
In columns 3 to 6, we show results from split sample analyses for resource-related and 
non-resource-related FDI. In the resource sector, the coefficient on BRD is positive, very 
small and not statistically significant (column 3). The addition of the localized conflict 
moderator (column 4) slightly increases the estimate of the positive effect of BRD, but the 
moderator itself is small and statistically insignificant. Additionally, the long-term effect of 
BRD on resource-related FDI is positive and insignificant. Hence, there is no evidence that 
political violence affects greenfield FDI flows to this sector, either over the short or long 
term.  
In the models in columns 5 and 6 explaining FDI to the non-resource sector, the effect of 
political conflict is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level; this effect is 
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slightly larger than that for total FDI. A 10% increase in BRD decreases greenfield FDI 
flows to non-resource sector by 1.3%. A Chow test shows that this effect is significantly 
larger than the effect on resource-related FDI at the 5% level. Hence, we find empirical 
support for the third hypothesis (H3), namely that resource-related FDI is less sensitive to 
conflict than non-resource-related FDI.  
The scope-of-conflict moderator (column 6) is positive, relatively large, and significant at 
the 5% level. A Chow test shows that the moderator is significantly larger in the model 
explaining non-resource-related FDI (column 6) than in the model analyzing resource-
related FDI (column 4). Hence, we find support for hypothesis 4. Due to the addition of the 
moderator, the coefficient of BRD becomes more negative and its significance increases to 
the 1% level. Whereas an increase in the BRD in a localized conflict does not affect 
greenfield FDI in the non-resource sector (effect size = 0.023, standard error = 0.072), a 
10% increase in the BRDs in a nationwide conflict is associated with a significant 
reduction of 2.3% in greenfield FDI in the non-resource sector, ceteris paribus. The long-
term effect is even slightly larger.  
With respect to the control variables in the split sample analysis (columns 3-6), the lagged 
FDI term and the size of the population are highly significant in the regressions for both 
sectors. Exchange rates, the level of democracy and inflation do not significantly affect 
FDI in any of the specifications. The control of corruption and exchange rate volatility are 
important only in the non-resource sector, whereas GDP and regulatory quality have a 
significant effect only in the resource sector. The finding that the regulatory quality 
measure has an opposite sign in the split sample analyses is noteworthy. Compared to 
political violence, low-quality investment regulations pose a continuous risk to MNEs 
because these institutions are very persistent, and the risk posed by them is predictable. 
Our results suggest that the regulatory environment matters for resource activities, which 
tend to be associated with large capital investments. None of the results changed 
substantively when a non-corrected LSDV estimator was used, suggesting that the Nickell 
bias is small.25,26 
Table 3.2 shows the results for hypothesis 5. For these regressions we aggregated 
greenfield FDI, distinguishing between investments made by relatively diversified and 
undiversified MNEs. Since this results in a three-dimensional dataset (country - year - 
diversification dummy), the Bun and Kiviet LSDVC estimator is unsuitable. Instead, we 
                                                 
25 The results of the non-corrected LSDV are reported in the appendix with a random 
effects and pooled OLS model. All support our hypotheses (1), (3) and (4).  
26 In an additional analysis, we excluded the level and volatility of exchange rates because 
the inclusion of these variables reduced the size of our sample by 25%. The results were 
qualitatively the same as those reported herein and are available from the authors on 
request.  
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estimate an Ordinary Least Square model with country and year fixed effects and robust 
standard errors.27  
Table 3.2 Effect of Political Conflict on FDI by relatively Undiversified and Diversified Firms 
 Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI (in USD millions), LSDV 
Estimation 
 Total FDI Resource-Related FDI Non-Resource-Related FDI 
 Undiversi
-fied 
MNEs 
Diversifie
d MNEs 
Undiversi
-fied 
MNEs 
Diversifie
d MNEs 
Undiversi
-fied 
MNEs 
Diversified 
MNEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BRDt-1 (ln) -0.129+ -0.015 0.060 0.088 -0.145* -0.064 
 (0.073) (0.082) (0.071) (0.071) (0.061) (0.061) 
Constant -50.651 -53.071 -106.398* -108.520* -51.979+ -54.134+ 
 (34.898) (34.912) (49.570) (49.577) (30.738) (30.729) 
BRD (ln)*localizedt-1 -0.001 -0.122 0.084 
 (0.079) (0.092) (0.069) 
Greenfield FDI-i, t-1 (ln) 0.120** 0.037 0.137*** 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.036) 
GDPt-1 -0.100 -0.933 0.293 
 (0.460) (0.655) (0.442) 
Populationt-1 (ln) 3.955 7.898* 3.761+ 
 (2.417) (3.316) (2.155) 
WGI regulatory qualityt-
1 
0.275 1.091 -0.454 
 (0.706) (1.017) (0.620) 
Polity Indext-1 -0.037 0.008 -0.050 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.036) 
Exchange Ratet-1 (ln) -0.400 0.050 -0.319 
 (0.295) (0.459) (0.295) 
Exchange Rate 
Volatilityt-1 
-13.326* -6.163 -4.232 
 (5.404) (7.057) (3.556) 
Control of Corruptiont-1 1.000+ 0.361 1.117* 
 (0.568) (0.778) (0.542) 
Inflationt-1 0.001 0.011 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) 
Observations 1,234 1,234 1,234 
Number of Countries 90 90 90 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Political conflict proxied by battle-related deaths. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
                                                 
27 For the analysis in Table 1 we show that the Nickell bias is limited and we assume that 
the bias remains negligible in the models distinguishing between diversified and 
undiversified MNEs. 
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The results in column 1 show that the effect of BRD on undiversified firms’ greenfield 
FDI flows is negative but only statistically significant at the 10% level. A 10% increase in 
BRD is associated with a 1.3% decrease in FDI flows made by undiversified MNEs. In 
contrast, the effect of BRD on FDI of diversified firms, defined as those having 
subsidiaries in 10 countries or more, is close to zero and is not significant (column 2). A 
Chow test shows that the coefficients in models 1 and 2 are statistically different from one 
another at the 1% level, supporting hypothesis 5 that political conflict has a smaller effect 
on FDI made by diversified MNEs than on FDI made by undiversified MNEs. In columns 
3 to 6, we also distinguish between resource-related and non-resource-related greenfield 
FDI flows of diversified and undiversified firms. The effect of BRD on resource-related 
FDI flows is small and statistically insignificant, irrespective of whether these are 
investments made by undiversified or diversified MNEs. This supports our previous 
finding that political conflict does not significantly affect resource-related FDI flows (see 
Table 3.1, columns 3-4). 
The results for non-resource-related FDI flows (Table 3.2, columns 5-6) show a different 
pattern. Nationwide conflict negatively affects the non-resource-related FDI flows of 
undiversified firms. This effect is significant at the 5% level, indicating that a 10% 
increase in BRD decreases non-resource-related FDI flows of undiversified MNEs by 
1.5%. Non-resource-related FDI flows of diversified MNEs are less affected by increases 
in the number of BRD and the coefficient is not statistically significant. The difference 
between the coefficients in regressions 5 and 6 is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, whether firms are geographically diversified matters for the relationship between 
political conflict and greenfield FDI flows only in the case of non-resource-related FDI.  
3.5 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
In this section, we explore the robustness of the main results to the inclusion of other types 
of political violence. We also investigate the importance of within-sector heterogeneity and 
the robustness of our results to using an alternative measure of political conflict, 
distinguishing in particular between wars and conflicts. In addition, we test our hypotheses 
at the firm level using a two-stage Heckman model. Finally, the section discusses the 
special case of the hydrocarbons industry and the role of economic rents and geographic 
constraints on investment. 
Different types of political violence 
We argued in the theoretical section that there are two necessary conditions for political 
violence to affect FDI inflows. Violence must have a sufficient effect on a subsidiary’s 
profits and pose a relatively continuous risk to its operations. Because political conflict is 
the only type of political violence that meets these conditions, we focused on this type of 
violence in the main results section. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that the effect of 
other types of political violence on FDI flows is mixed. Most studies on terrorism focus on 
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its impact on developed economies. They find that terrorism leads to a negative shock to a 
country’s GDP and global capital markets (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Chen & Siems, 
2004), a drop in inward FDI (Enders & Sandler, 1996), an increase of vacancy rates in 
Central Business Districts (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008), and a drop in the number of tourists 
(Drakos & Kutan, 2003). Studies on the effect of terrorism in developing countries, 
particularly those focusing on its relationship with FDI, are considerably less abundant. 
Moreover, those that consider developing nations show conflicting results (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2008; Enders et al., 2006; Li, 2006; Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Powers & Choi, 
2012). Similarly, studies on the effect of assassinations and political terror on total FDI do 
not reach a consensus (Asiedu, 2002; 2006; Bary, Clay & Flynn, 2014; Blanton & Blanton, 
2007; Edwards, 1990). Most of these authors ignore other forms of political violence and 
risk in their empirical strategies, which could largely explain the mixed results.  
In Table 3.3, we include measures for terrorism, political terror and assassinations in our 
regression models to test our assumption that political violence must be both relatively 
continuous and detrimental to returns on economic activity. We measure terrorism using 
the number of deaths during terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
This database, developed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, is based on reports from a variety of open media sources (LaFree 
& Dugan, 2007). We prefer this proxy to the number of terrorist attacks because it 
measures not only the prevalence of attacks, but also their intensity. The number of 
terrorist fatalities is highly skewed; hence, we transform the measure using the natural log 
of the inverse hyperbolic sine function. We measure political terror with the widely used 
Political Terror Scale (Wood & Gibney, 2010), an index constructed based on information 
from three sources: Amnesty International Yearly Country Reports, the U.S. State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and the World Reports of 
Human Rights Watch. The index ranges from 0 in the case of a strong rule of law to 5 in 
the case of widespread political terror. We measure the numbers of assassinations using the 
Cross-National Time Series data developed by Banks (2015).  
The results confirm that terrorism, political terror, and assassinations in a country do not 
affect its total greenfield FDI inflows (Table 3.3, columns 1-3). The coefficient of the 
conflict variable BRD is negative and significant at the 10% level in two of the three 
regression models (columns 1-2). Although terrorism and assassinations do not 
significantly affect greenfield FDI in the resource sector, political terror has a positive 
effect on investment in this industry (columns 4-6), indicating that MNEs in the resource 
sector benefit from a certain level of oppression. This benefit could be explained by the 
fact that a high level of oppression might be necessary to keep certain governments in 
place. MNEs active in the resource sector might benefit in such an environment because 
they depend upon government contracts that might be reneged upon by a new government; 
hence, these MNEs have the most to lose if an incumbent ruler is removed from office. 
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The effect of conflict on resource greenfield FDI remains small and insignificant (columns 
4-6). In the models explaining non-resource FDI, terrorism, political terror, and 
assassinations are not significantly different from 0. The effect of conflict (BRD) remains 
strongly negative and significant at the 0.1% or 1% level. The type of conflict moderator is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Hence, nationwide political conflicts have a strong 
negative effect on non-resource FDI, whereas localized conflicts have a negligible effect 
on this type of FDI.  
Table 3.3 Effect of Political Conflict, Terrorism, Political Terror and Assassinations on Greenfield 
FDI 
  Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI (in USD millions), LSDVC Estimation 
  Total FDI Resource-related FDI Non-Resource related FDI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BRDt-1 (ln) 
-
0.133+ 
-
0.125
+ 
-0.112 0.037 -0.004 -0.036 
-
0.254**
* 
-
0.216*
* 
-
0.226*
* 
  (0.075
) 
(0.073
) 
(0.072
) 
(0.107
) 
(0.103
) 
(0.083
) 
(0.073) (0.071) (0.070) 
BRD (ln)* 
localizedt-1  
0.034 0.039 0.034 -0.074 -0.053 0.058 0.202* 0.198* 0.202* 
  (0.096
) 
(0.096
) 
(0.096
) 
(0.138
) 
(0.137
) 
(0.113
) 
(0.082) (0.094) (0.094) 
Terrorismt-1 (ln) 0.074   0.031   0.098   
  
(0.072
)   
(0.102
)   (0.070)   
Political terrort-1  0.186   
0.632*
*   -0.006  
  
 
(0.166
)   
(0.236
)   
(0.139) 
 
Assasinationst-1   
0.006 
  
0.035 
  
0.004 
 
 
 
(0.063
)   
(0.090
)   (0.062) 
Observations 707 707 707 707 707 707 707 707 707 
Number of 
countries 
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Economic 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Political conflict proxied by battle-related deaths. Bootstrapped standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Within-sector heterogeneity 
The analyses so far distinguish between non-resource and resource industries but there 
might be substantial within-sector heterogeneity that may affect our results. There are 
substantial differences between the manufacturing and service industries, for example, in 
terms of sunk costs and labor intensity. There might also be considerable heterogeneity in 
the natural resource category. Investments in the hydrocarbon industry (oil, gas and coal) 
might not be sensitive to political violence because they occur in remote locations 
(offshore). Recognizing these differences, we re-estimate the model using more 
disaggregated data on manufacturing and services FDI flows and hydrocarbon and non-
hydrocarbon FDI flows.  
Table 3.4 Effect of Political Conflict on Manufacturing, Services, Hydrocarbon, and Non-
hydrocarbon Greenfield FDI 
 
Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI (in USD millions), LSDVC 
Estimation 
 
Manufacturing 
FDI 
Service FDI Hydrocarbon 
FDI 
Non-
hydrocarbon FDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BRD (ln) -0.132+ -0.209** 0.055 0.091 
 (0.071) (0.067) (0.105) (0.091) BRD 
(ln)*localizedt-1  
0.123 0.168* 0.020 -0.082 
 
(0.101) (0.096) (0.142) (0.123) 
Observations 707 707 707 707 
Number of 
countries 90 90 90 90 
Economic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Note: Political conflict is proxied by battle-related deaths. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
in parentheses.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
Our results confirm that the negative effect of conflict on non-resource FDI is observed in 
both the manufacturing and service industries (Table 3.4, columns 1 and 2). The 
coefficients of the conflict variable and the scope-of-conflict moderator are similar across 
the two specifications and a Chow test shows that the coefficients of the BRD variable are 
not systematically different for the two industries. This indicates that it is valid to group 
manufacturing and services into one non-resource industry. The results in columns 3 and 4 
suggest that the effect of conflict on hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon FDI is comparable 
in size and positive but insignificant in both cases. In addition, a Chow-test shows that the 
difference between the BRD coefficients in columns 3 and 4 is not statistically significant. 
Hence, there is no evidence that the insensitivity of resource-related FDI to political 
conflict is driven solely by the hydrocarbon sector.  
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Conflict and war onset 
As an additional robustness check, we use a dummy variable for conflict onset instead of 
our continuous BRD variable to measure whether a country experiences a conflict or a war 
according to the definitions of UCDP/PRIO. We code an observation as a conflict if there 
were at least 25 BRD but not more than 1000 BRD in a year and as a war (or a large 
conflict) if there are at least 1000 BRD per year. Thus, we measure the effect of conflict 
and war onset rather than the intensity of the disputes. Figure 3.4 shows that conflicts are 
more prevalent than wars and that in both categories approximately half of the disputes are 
localized and the other half are nationwide.  
 
Figure 3.4 Incidence of conflict and war and their geographic scope in developing 
countries over the period of 2003-2012  
Table 3.5 shows the results of the LSDVC regression model, including dummy variables 
for conflict and war and moderators for their geographic scope. In Column 1 the 
coefficient of the political conflict dummy is negative and significant at the 0.1% level and 
the coefficient on the scope-of-conflict moderator is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. These results indicate that the onset of a nationwide political conflict has a large 
effect on greenfield investments and that the scope of conflict matters to MNEs. The onset 
of a nationwide political conflict decreases greenfield FDI flows on average by 86.2%, 
whereas the onset of a localized political conflict has a smaller effect which is not 
significantly different from zero (effect size = -0.413, standard error = 0.503). The main 
effect of war onset is also negative and as statistically significant as in the case of conflict 
onset, but as expected the size of the war effect is much larger than that of conflict. There 
is evidence that the scope of violence matters in this case too. The moderator for the onset 
of a localized war is positive and significant at the 10% level. Quantitatively, the onset of a 
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nationwide war has a very large effect on greenfield FDI flows; on average, the onset of 
nationwide wars is associated with a decline in greenfield investment flows of 93.2%. The 
onset of a localized war has a smaller effect on greenfield FDI and it is not significantly 
different from zero (effect size = -0.937, standard error = 0.778). 
In Column 2 the main effect of conflict onset on resource-related FDI is negative, but 
insignificant. The coefficient of the moderator for geographic scope is positive, but also 
insignificant. Hence, there is no evidence that the onset of a conflict affects resource FDI, 
independent of the scope of the conflict. However, the onset of a war has a negative effect 
on resource-related FDI, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. The onset of a 
nationwide war decreases resource FDI flows by 84.1%, whereas that of a localized war 
has a small and statistically insignificant effect (effect size=-0.103, standard error = 1.183).  
Table 3.5 Effect of Political Conflict and War on Total FDI, Resource FDI and Non-
Resource FDI  
 
Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI (in USD millions), LSDVC 
Estimation 
 
Total FDI Resource-related FDI Non-resource-related FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Conflict Dummyt-1 -1.985*** -0.562 -1.632** 
 
(0.528) (0.762) (0.522) 
Conflict 
Dummy*Localizedt-1 1.572* 0.123 1.683* 
 
(0.689) (0.995) (0.679) 
War Dummyt-1 -2.692*** -1.842+ -2.172*** 
 
(0.664) (0.957) (0.655) 
War Dummy*Localizedt-1 1.755+ 1.739 0.954 
 (0.999) (1.441) (0.986) 
Observations 707 707 707 
No. of Countries 90 90 90 
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10 
In model 3 the main effect of conflict onset on non-resource-related FDI flows is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. The geographic scope moderator is positive and significant 
at the 5% level. The onset of a nationwide conflict reduces greenfield FDI flows to the 
non-resource sector by 80.4%, but the effect of a localized conflict is not significantly 
different from 0 (effect size = 0.051, standard error = 0.547). The onset of a war has a 
strong negative effect, but this effect is again only statistically significant if the war is 
nationwide. This analysis suggests that even when we consider conflict onset rather than 
conflict intensity, we find support for the hypotheses proposed in the theoretical section of 
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the paper. One additional insight we obtain is that unlike conflict onset, war onset has a 
negative effect on all types of greenfield FDI.  
Firm-level Model 
In this section, we discuss how we test our hypotheses using firm-level panel data. This 
method has the advantage of enabling us to measure geographic diversification 
continuously and to add control variables for firm-level characteristics that might confound 
the relation between FDI and political conflict. However, the disadvantage is that for many 
of the observations in the original dataset, firm-level variables were not available. 
Although as many as 67.1% of all parent companies in the fDi Markets dataset could be 
matched to firms registered in ORBIS, only for 1,413 of those firms (10.2%) data on firm-
level characteristics were available. Although a sample of this size is not rare in IB 
research, it considerably decreases the precision of our estimates and the ability to detect 
statistically significant effects. In addition, a missing value logistic regression (Long & 
Freese, 2006) shows that firm-level data are not missing at random; the probability that 
data are missing depends on the sector and the level of political conflict. As this could 
considerably bias our results, we prefer the country-level estimates and show the estimates 
of the firm-level regressions merely for robustness. 
The firm-level dataset comprises data on the 1,413 MNEs that invested in a developing 
country between the years 2003 and 2012 according to the fDi Markets dataset. For each 
MNE (m) we report greenfield FDI to a host country (i) in a certain year (t), resulting in 
the following regression model: 
,  (2) 
Similarly to our previous models, the independent variable of interest is political conflict P 
for country i in the previous year, while we control for destination country variables Xi(t-1), 
a set of country dummies μi, and a vector of time dummies μt.  In addition, we add fixed 
effects for the country of origin μo, controlling for time-invariant characteristics of the 
home country of the MNE. We also add a set of firm-level control variables , 
including greenfield FDI flows by the MNE m to country i in the previous year, the age of 
the firm (ln), the number of employees (ln), the rate of return on equity (ROE), and 
geographic diversification, measured by the number of countries in which the 
multinational is present (ln). The diversification variable is standardized to simplify the 
interpretation of the main effect of political conflict and the moderator. Finally, we include 
a set of bilateral variables, , controlling for the population-weighted distance (ln) 
between the host country i and country of origin o and whether the origin and host country 
share a common language, common border, or colonial history. Data on these bilateral 
variables were obtained from the gravity dataset developed by Head, Mayer and Ries 
(2010).  
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Table 3.6 Heckman estimation of the effect of Political Conflict on firm level greenfield 
FDI flows 
 
Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI (in USD millions), Heckman 
estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total FDI Resource-related FDI Non-resource-related 
FDI 
 Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
BRDt-1 (ln) -0.247* -0.009 -0.093 -0.018 -0.276* 0.002 
 (0.109) (0.022) (0.200) (0.041) (0.108) (0.023) 
BRD (ln) * 
localizedt-1 
0.301** 0.000 0.142 0.021 0.308** -0.010 
 (0.106) (0.022) (0.191) (0.041) (0.106) (0.023) 
BRD(ln)* 
Diversficationt-1 
-0.018 0.007+ 0.010 0.004 -0.007 0.007* 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.027) (0.007) (0.012) (0.004) 
Bilateral Controls 
Distance 0.196+ -0.228*** -0.908 -0.337*** -0.058 -0.254*** 
 (0.113) (0.016) (0.571) (0.039) (0.215) (0.017) 
Common Border -0.961** 0.424*** 0.925 0.349* -0.523 0.496*** 
 (0.371) (0.079) (0.953) (0.172) (0.535) (0.080) 
Common 
Language 
-0.538** 0.307*** 1.729* 0.337*** -0.152 0.339*** 
 (0.196) (0.040) (0.767) (0.080) (0.379) (0.042) 
Colonial History  0.126**  0.145+  0.181*** 
  (0.046)  (0.087)  (0.049) 
Firm Controls 
Diversificationt-1   -0.155* 0.096*** 0.516 0.216*** -0.065 0.128*** 
 (0.062) (0.014) (0.381) (0.036) (0.113) (0.015) 
FDI t-1 (ln) 0.009 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.068*** 0.001 0.059*** 
 (0.018) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) 
Age t-1 (ln) -0.105** -0.019* -0.209+ -0.029 -0.095** -0.004 
 (0.035) (0.009) (0.118) (0.025) (0.033) (0.010) 
ROE t-1 -0.001 0.000+ -0.001 -0.002* 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Employees t-1 (ln) -0.059 0.118*** 0.247 0.137*** 0.106 0.170*** 
 (0.051) (0.006) (0.239) (0.014) (0.137) (0.006) 
Constant 177.034**
* 
-57.929*** 39.617 -50.043** 201.298**
* 
-62.014*** 
 (46.194) (9.001) (77.702) (19.365) (48.315) (9.271) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
-1.427**  0.300  -1.550***  
 (0.434)  (0.511)  (0.454)  
Observations 519,030 58,528 491,123 
Econ. Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes 
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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We estimate a two-stage Heckman model to simultaneously examine investment at the 
extensive margin - i.e. whether to invest - and the intensive margin - i.e. how much to 
invest. The first stage analyzing the extensive margin consists of a probit model, where the 
dependent variable is 1 if a MNE invested in a host country in year t and 0 otherwise. The 
second stage, examining the intensive margin, consists of an OLS-model estimating the 
amount of greenfield FDI (transformed using the inverse sine-transformation) for those 
firms that decided to invest. To avoid multicollinearity resulting from limited nonlinearity 
in the functional form, we use the colonial history dummy as our exclusion restriction. 
However, our results are also robust to using different exclusion restrictions.  
Table 3.6 presents the results from the two-stage Heckman model. Column 1 shows the 
results for the regression of the intensive margin, where the dependent variable is the 
amount of greenfield FDI flows given that an MNE invests in a country. At the average 
geographic diversification level, a nationwide conflict has a significant negative effect on 
total FDI flows, whereas a localized conflict does not significantly affect greenfield FDI 
flows (Column 1). This is consistent with our hypotheses and main results. However, in 
the equation for the extensive margin there is no significant main effect of BRD, 
irrespective of the type of conflict. Hence, political conflict affects greenfield FDI flows 
through a decrease in the size of investment projects, whilst there is no evidence that 
conflict affects the probability that an MNE invests in a country. 
The diversification moderator is not statistically significant for the intensive margin, but it 
is positive and significant at the 10% level for the extensive margin (Column 2). At 
particularly high levels of geographic diversification, with presence in at least 26 countries, 
the effect of BRD becomes positive. This indicates that for MNEs that are better able to 
absorb the risk posed by political violence, the increase of conflict can actually positively 
affect the probability of investment. Although this might seem counterintuitive, it could 
suggest that MNEs that are sufficiently diversified have a competitive advantage in 
countries with high discontinuous risk and can accordingly reap the monopoly rents 
associated with this advantage. This can in turn initiate entry into high-risk environments.  
Concerning the control variables, distance positively affects the intensive margin, but has a 
negative effect on the extensive margin. A common border and a shared language 
negatively affect the intensive margin, but positively affect the extensive margin. In 
addition, a shared colonial history has a positive effect on the extensive margin. Hence, the 
bilateral controls indicate that an increase in psychic distance decreases the probability that 
an MNE sets up a subsidiary in a country, but increases the size of the FDI flow if the 
MNE makes an investment. Moreover, FDI in the previous year, the rate of return on 
equity and the number of employees positively and significantly affect the probability of 
investment, whereas they do not affect the size of the investments. Age has a significant 
negative effect on both the intensive and extensive margin, whereas geographic 
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diversification increases the probability of an MNE making an investment, while 
decreasing the size of FDI flow.  
We also estimate the Heckman model separately for resource and non-resource FDI 
decisions.28 The estimates for non-resource-related FDI flows (Column 3) are similar to 
those of total FDI flows. This is not surprising; in the firm-level dataset 88% of the 
observations concern non-resource FDI flows. However, the estimates for the resource 
sector differ (Column 2). Political conflict, the type of conflict and the diversification 
moderator are no longer significant. In line with our hypotheses, the effect sizes are also 
considerable smaller than the effects on non-resource-related FDI flows. However, the 
number of MNEs in the resource-related FDI regression is small and therefore, the 
estimates of the coefficients are relatively imprecise. This concern in combination with the 
sample selection effect, explained above, lowers our confidence in the Heckman estimates 
for the resource sector.  
Testing the Mechanisms: The Role of Economic Rents and Geographic Constraints  
This section examines the factors behind the insensitivity of resource-related FDI to 
political violence by focusing on the two mechanisms discussed in the theory section: the 
size of the economic rents and the geographic constraints on location choice. We focus on 
the oil and gas industry because no data on rents and location choice are available for other 
natural resource industries. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy provides a large 
dataset containing information on global oil, gas reserves and prices, obtained from 
government sources and published data. As a proxy for geographic constraints on location 
choice, we use proven global reserves of oil and gas that can be extracted from known 
reservoirs with reasonable certainty in the future. We first standardize the oil and gas 
reserves data (because oil and gas reserves are measured in different units) and 
subsequently take the average of the two measures to obtain our gasoilreserves variable. 
We then interact this score with battle-related deaths to test the limited-location-choice 
mechanism. The main effect of global oil and gas reserves is excluded because it does not 
vary over countries and is hence absorbed by the time fixed effects.  
It is possible that oil-and-gas-related FDI flows and political violence are the result of the 
discovery of one of these valuable resources. Therefore, we also control for large oil and 
                                                 
2828 We estimate separate Heckman regressions for resource-related and non-resource-
related FDI flows instead of including interaction effects to avoid the issue of 
interpretation concerning three-way interactions. In addition, the regression results in 
Table 1 show that also the control variables behave differently for the two sectors. Finally, 
many of the firms in the resource sector also make greenfield FDI in the non-resource 
sector. 
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gas field discoveries within a country using a dataset obtained from the BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy. The variable for discovery is a dummy coded as one if a major 
oil or gas field was found in the country, and zero otherwise. A major gas/oil discovery is 
a discovery of a field that contains at least 500 million barrels of oil or 79 million m3 of gas 
(Halbouty, 2001).  
Table 3.7 Effect of Political Conflict on Greenfield FDI in the Oil and Gas sector 
 LSDVC estimations, greenfield FDI in USD millions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BRDt-1 (ln) 0.064 0.090 -0.091 -0.097 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.114) (0.130) 
Ln(BRD)*gasoilreservest- 1  -0.090* -0.156** -0.156** 
  (0.046) (0.055) (0.055) 
Ln(BRD)*gasoilindext-1   0.002* 0.002* 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(BRD)*localizedt-1     0.013 
    (0.141) 
Major Gas/Oil discoveriest-1 -0.391 -0.332 -0.337 -0.336 
 (0.507) (0.507) (0.505) (0.505) 
FDIt-1 (ln) 0.086* 0.086* 0.081+ 0.081+ 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
GDPt-1 (ln) -0.962 -0.950 -1.004 -1.008 
 (0.877) (0.877) (0.874) (0.877) 
Population (ln) 13.495** 14.050** 13.965** 13.973** 
 (4.312) (4.330) (4.313) (4.322) 
WGI regulatory qualityt-1 1.287 1.121 1.104 1.096 
 (0.997) (1.002) (0.998) (0.996) 
WGI Corruption t-1  -0.419 -0.482 -0.656 -0.659 
 (0.905) (0.905) (0.907) (0.909) 
Polity Indext-1 -0.061 -0.038 -0.052 -0.053 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Real Exchange Ratet-1 (ln) 0.415 0.470 0.468 0.466 
 (0.545) (0.544) (0.542) (0.543) 
Exchange Rate Volatilityt-1 -2.525 -1.560 -3.752 -3.798 
 (11.240) (11.242) (11.206) (11.208) 
Inflationt-1 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 707 707 707 707 
Number of countries 90 90 90 90 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The gas and oil reserves variable is standardized, and the gas and oil index is a price index.  
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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We proxy oil and gas rents with a global price index of oil and gas prices (gasoilindex). 
This index is constructed using data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. We 
take 2003 as the base year and subtract 100 from the index to ease the interpretation of our 
results. We interact this price index with battle-related deaths to test for the effect of rents 
on the responsiveness of resource-related FDI to political violence. The main effect of our 
global oil and gas price measure is excluded because it does not vary over countries and is 
hence absorbed by the time fixed effects.  
Column 1 of Table 3.7 shows the baseline model for the oil and gas industry. Similar to 
column 3 in Table 3.4, the results show that the effect of political violence on oil and gas 
FDI is comparable to the effect on total resource-related FDI flows (see columns 3-4, 
Table 3.1): battle-related deaths do not have a significant effect on oil-and-gas-related FDI. 
In columns 2 and 3, respectively, we add the moderator for hydrocarbon reserves and 
moderator for the price index. Figures 3.5a and 3.5b present the effect of these moderators, 
as estimated in model 3. The moderating effect of reserves on the relationship between 
battle-related deaths and oil and gas FDI is negative and significant, indicating that when 
new oil and gas reserves are discovered, MNEs active in the oil and gas sector are less 
willing to invest in countries marred by political violence. Nevertheless, the change in 
global reserves must be large for the total effect of conflict on greenfield FDI flowing to 
the hydrocarbon sector to be different from zero. Figure 3.5a shows that the effect of 
battle-related deaths on oil-and-gas-related FDI flows is positive if global reserves 
decrease by 0.5 standard deviations or more relative to the mean. However, the effect only 
becomes significantly greater than zero if global reserves decrease by at least 2.5 standard 
deviations relative to the mean. The effect of conflict on oil and gas FDI is significantly 
smaller than zero only if reserves increase by 2.0 standard deviations or more relative to 
the mean. If global reserves increase by two standard deviations relative to the mean, a 10 
percent increase in battle-related deaths is associated with a reduction of greenfield FDI in 
the oil-and-gas sector of approximately 4%, ceteris paribus. Hence, our results suggest that 
during the estimation period, the geographic-constraints mechanism was at work.  
The effect of political violence is positively moderated by oil and gas prices, indicating 
that the effect of battle-related deaths on FDI flows to the oil and gas sector depends 
positively upon the global prices of oil and gas. This dependency implies that during 
commodity booms when prices are high, MNEs are more likely to enter countries marred 
by political conflict than when prices are low. Figure 3.5b shows that only in cases of 
exceptionally high oil and gas prices do the effects of political violence on oil- and gas-
related FDIs become significantly different from zero. For example, if prices are at their 
base 2003 level and global reserves are at their mean value, the effect of political violence 
on oil-and-gas-related FDIs flows is negative but insignificant. However, when the oil-
and-gas price index increases to 240, i.e., the 2012 level, the effect of battle-related deaths 
becomes significantly positive at the 5% level. Hence, we find that the effect of political 
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violence on oil and gas FDI flows depends positively on economic rents or the profitability 
of oil and gas extraction and that the rent mechanism was at work towards the end of our 
investigation period. Finally, in Column (4), we add the moderator effect of localized and 
battle-related deaths to the model. The effect of this moderator is positive but insignificant 
and does not change the results associated with the rents and geographic-constraints 
mechanisms.  
  
Figures 3.5a and 3.5b Marginal effect of ln(BRD) on oil- and gas-related FDIs at different 
levels of global oil and gas reserves (std) and oil and gas prices, respectively 
 
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study makes several contributions to the literature on political violence and FDI, 
particularly on the heterogeneous nature of their relationship. We argue that the 
relationship between political violence and greenfield FDI flows is contingent on the type 
of violence, the characteristics of the FDI-receiving sector and the international scope of 
the MNE. We differentiate among several different types of political violence: high- and 
low-impact events, discontinuous and continuous events, and localized and nationwide 
events. We also differentiate between resource and non-resource sectors, focusing 
specifically on differences stemming from geographic constraints on location choice and 
economic rents.  
By disaggregating total FDI into sectoral flows and limiting our analysis to a homogeneous 
set of greenfield investments, we show that the effect of political conflict on greenfield 
FDI flows depends upon sector characteristics, particularly those flows tied to economic 
rents and geographic constraints on location choice. We show that while non-resource-
related greenfield FDI flows are negatively associated with political conflict, resource-
related greenfield FDI flows do not significantly decrease when political conflict 
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intensifies. We also find evidence that the effect of nationwide political conflict on non-
resource FDI tends to be greater than the effect of localized conflict. Resource-related FDI 
is affected neither by localized nor geographically dispersed conflicts. Finally, we find 
evidence that political conflict particularly deters investment by MNEs that are relatively 
geographically undiversified. These results are remarkably robust across different 
specifications and provide a plausible explanation for the ambiguous results reported in the 
literature.  
We empirically show that the insensitivity of resource MNEs to political violence can be 
attributed to the high profitability of resource extraction and these companies’ geographic 
constraints on location choice during the period of estimation. These characteristics might 
not be the only attributes that distinguish the resource from the non-resource sector. 
Greenfield FDI in the resource sector also tends to be more dependent on government 
contracts and might have a longer time horizon. Yet, our moderator analysis for the 
hydrocarbon sector shows that high profitability of resource extraction and geographic 
constraints on location choice largely explain the insensitivity of the resource sector to 
political violence. The two mechanisms are related, as suggested by the prolonged period 
of high oil prices in the 2000s and the subsequent increase in investment opportunities 
provided by the discovery of hydraulic fracturing. During periods of commodity booms, 
profitability and limited investment opportunities reinforce one another. However, when 
the development of alternative sources of energy reduces the constraints on location choice 
within the resource sector, or if the economic rents associated with resource extraction 
drop, resource MNEs are likely to be considerably less willing to invest in countries 
experiencing political conflict. Although we use the oil and gas sector to illustrate the 
effect of the rents mechanism and the geographic constraints mechanism on the propensity 
of MNEs operating in this industry to invest in conflict areas, we recognize that certain 
non-resource sectors might also be characterized by these mechanisms. Hence, we argue 
more generally that MNEs active in sectors in which these mechanisms are at play are 
more likely to invest in countries experiencing political conflict.   
Finally, our results suggest that a certain level of continuity and impact are necessary 
conditions for political violence to affect greenfield FDI flows. Only political conflict, a 
continuous and high-impact type of political violence, has a significant effect on greenfield 
FDI. Other types of political violence, such as terrorism and assassinations, do not affect 
greenfield investments, although political terror is positively associated with the flow of 
greenfield FDI into resources, possibly because political repression reduces political 
instability and the risk that resource licenses might be reneged upon due to government 
change.  
The findings in this paper point to a vicious cycle between resource dependence and 
conflict by providing evidence that political violence entrenches the resource dependency 
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of fragile countries. We show that some types of political violence, namely repression 
through political terror, can be positively associated with resource-related FDI and that 
political conflict is detrimental to non-resource-related FDI – the type of investment 
considered most effective in promoting structural transformation and employment creation. 
At the same time, conflict does not affect resource-related FDI – the type of investment 
associated with the resource curse (Collier, 1998; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hodler, 2006; 
Poelhekke & Van der Ploeg, 2013; Sachs & Warner, 1995).  
These findings provide managers of MNEs with a more nuanced understanding of the 
effects of political violence and the risks it poses to the MNE. We show that the continuity 
of the risk posed is an important factor influencing MNEs’ entry strategy. However, also 
sector characteristics that influence an MNE’s sensitivity to risk, the MNE’s exposure to 
violence and the ability to diversify risk should be taken into account when making a risk 
assessment of investment into developing countries marred by political violence. As such, 
our results emphasize that the assumption that political violence necessarily depresses 
earnings and puts off investors is too simplistic. Our finding that political conflict 
positively affects greenfield FDI by the most diversified firms, suggests that entry into 
conflict countries might even increase earnings if MNEs are able to absorb discontinuous 
risk. As such, MNEs might want to consider entry into conflict countries – taking into 
account sector and firm attributes, despite the large level of risk posed, with the intention 
of obtaining a competitive advantage. 
The main limitation of this study is that the empirical analysis cannot establish a causal 
relationship between FDI and political violence; therefore, the results should be interpreted 
as conditional associations. Although it is unlikely that total FDI flows have a direct effect 
on the number of battle-related deaths, FDI in the natural resource sector might affect 
political violence – particularly separatist violence – by intensifying grievances or 
increasing the perceived gains of secession. However, finding sources of exogenous 
variation in political violence that can be exploited in a panel format is challenging. 
Therefore, we address the endogeneity problem by including fixed effects and a large set 
of control variables, including income and quality of institutions. In the robustness 
analyses, we also control for the discovery of large oil and gas reserves because it is likely 
that the discovery of valuable resources rather than the involvement of an MNE fuels 
conflict. This additional control variable does not change our main results.  
Another limitation lies in the data sources used. The data on greenfield FDI flows are 
collected through Financial Times newswires, internal information sources, other media 
sources, project data acquired from industry organizations and investment agencies and 
data purchased from market research and publication companies. MNEs investing in 
conflict countries might actively avoid publication of the investment project in the media 
to avoid a public outcry. This selection effect could drive our results on the effect of 
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political conflict on total greenfield FDI flows. To our knowledge, however, there are no 
FDI datasets that are not based on media coverage while simultaneously covering an 
equally large set of countries and allowing for disaggregation at the sector level. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that our results on sector heterogeneity are driven by sample 
selection bias. It could be expected that particularly resource-related FDI is sensitive to 
public outcry because this type of investment is generally believed to have negative 
environmental, economic and institutional development effects (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; 
Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hodler, 2006; Ross, 2004; Sachs & Warner, 1995). Non-resource-
related greenfield FDI, however, is widely considered a vehicle for economic development 
and accordingly does not have a reputation as bad as resource-related FDI (Poelhekke & 
Van der Ploeg, 2013). Hence, it could be expected that managers in this sector face fewer 
incentives to avoid publication of FDI projects than do managers in the resource sector. 
Such a selection mechanism would yield results opposite to ours. It is therefore unlikely 
that this drives our sector-level results.  
In addition, our data covers the relative short time period from 2003 to 2012. This limits 
our ability to analyze dynamics, including variations in the lag-structure of our models and 
the effect of sustained political conflicts. Accordingly, we cannot rule out that gestation 
periods are longer in the resource than in the non-resource sector. This could partially 
explain why we find that these firms are relatively insensitive to political conflict in the 
previous year. However, the results of our analysis for the hydrocarbon sector show that 
insensitivity of resource FDI to political conflict can be primarily explained by the 
profitability of resource extraction and geographic constraints on location choice. Because 
gestation periods are likely to be time-invariant, differences in gestation periods between 
the resource and non-resource FDI are unlikely to bias these estimates.   
This study explores the heterogeneous effects of political violence on greenfield FDI flows 
to developing countries. Additional research could examine sectoral FDI and conflict at the 
subnational level. During such an examination, it is possible to consider the distance from 
the investment location to the epicenter of a conflict, the exact location and characteristics 
of an MNE, and the role of oil rent sharing between subnational and national governments 
in determining what affects the likelihood of MNE investment in an affected region. In 
addition, future research could explore how gestation periods matter for MNEs’ sensitivity 
to political violence and whether prolonged conflicts affect firms differently than short-
term outbursts of violence.  
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Appendix 3.2: List of countries in the sample 
Albania Ethiopia  Morocco 
Algeria Gabon Mozambique 
Angola Gambia Namibia 
Armenia Georgia Nepal 
Azerbaijan Ghana Nicaragua 
Bangladesh Guatemala Niger 
Belarus Guinea Nigeria 
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Pakistan  
Botswana Guyana Panama 
Brazil Haiti Papua New Guinea 
Bulgaria Honduras Paraguay 
Burkina Faso India Peru 
Burundi Indonesia Philippines 
Cambodia Iran Rwanda 
Cameroon Iraq Senegal 
Central African Republic Jamaica Sierra Leone 
Chad Jordan South Africa 
China Kazakhstan Sri Lanka 
Colombia Kenya Sudan (-2011) 
Congo Lebanon Suriname 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Liberia Syria 
Costa Rica Libya Tajikistan 
Cote d'Ivoire Madagascar Thailand 
Cuba Malawi Togo 
Djibouti Malaysia Tunisia 
Dominican Republic Mali Turkey 
Ecuador Mauritania Uganda 
Egypt Mexico Ukraine 
El Salvador Moldova Uzbekistan 
Eritrea Mongolia Yemen 
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Appendix 3.3: Results of Fixed Effects (LSDV), Random Effects and pooled OLS 
models  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.10 
 
Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI (in USD millions), LSDV Estimation 
 
Total FDI Resource FDI Non-Resource FDI 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
BRDt-1 (ln) -0.120+ 0.040 -0.228*** 
 
(0.065) (0.093) (0.064) 
BRDt-1 (ln)*localized 0.049 -0.066 0.208* 
 
(0.091) (0.129) (0.088) 
Observations 707 707 707 
Number of Countries 90 90 90 
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Dependent Variable: Log  greenfield FDI  (in USD millions), Random 
Effects Estimation 
 
Total FDI Resource FDI Non-Resource FDI 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
BRDt-1 (ln) -0.089* -0.045 -0.101* 
 
(0.040) (0.047) (0.047) 
BRDt-1 
(ln)*localized 
0.082+ 0.035 0.111* 
 
(0.045) (0.061) (0.052) 
Observations 707 707 707 
Number of Countries 90 90 90 
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Dependent Variable: Log greenfield FDI  (in USD millions), Pooled OLS 
Estimation 
 
Total FDI Resource FDI Non-Resource FDI 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
BRDt-1 (ln) -0.089* -0.045 -0.101* 
 
(0.040) (0.047) (0.047) 
BRDt-1 (ln)*localized 0.082+ 0.035 0.111* 
 
(0.045) (0.061) (0.052) 
Observations 707 707 707 
Number of Countries 90 90 90 
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion & Discussion 
 
 
This chapter commences with a summary of the main findings of each chapter in this 
thesis (Section 5.1). In this section I revisit the conceptual triangle presented in the 
introduction. It is followed by a discussion of the implications of these findings for 
government agencies and managers of multinational enterprises (Section 5.2). In Section 
5.3 the limitations of the studies in this dissertation are discussed, followed by suggestion 
on how to address these in future research. In this section I provide future research 
suggestions for research in economics and in International Business separately. In a short 
epilogue (Section 5.4), where the focus is on the importance of solution-based research, I 
also outline the opportunities for researchers in these two fields to work together to address 
‘Grand Challenges’ like political conflict.  
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5.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
This thesis looks at the causes and consequences of political conflict. The findings can be 
depicted in the triangle introduced in the introduction and duplicated in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Illustration of the hypothesized political conflict, FDI and prosperity triangle. 
The solid lines represent the relations studied in this dissertation, while the dashed lines 
correspond to relations established in the literature. The numbers indicate the chapters of 
this dissertation in which the relationship is discussed. 
In Chapter 2 the causes of political conflict are examined. Here the focus lies on civil 
resistance, the non-violent counterpart of armed conflict. The findings demonstrate that a 
decrease in subjective wellbeing (i.e. happiness) can motivate citizens to engage in acts of 
civil resistance. This negative effect of overall wellbeing on non-violent uprisings is to a 
large extent the result of changes to satisfaction with living standards and the perceived 
capability to have a purposeful and meaningful life. Hence, in contrast to previous 
literature, I find that there are systematic causes of non-violent uprisings, although these 
causes might be difficult to capture using traditional socioeconomic indicators. However, 
there is no evidence for a direct relationship between unhappiness and armed conflict.  
In Chapter 3 and 4 I analyze the consequences of political conflict for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). This is depicted by the right-hand side arrow in Figure 5.1. In these 
chapters the focus is on armed conflict. In Chapter 3 I compare the effect of armed conflict 
to other types of political violence, i.e. terrorism, assassinations and political terror. The 
effect of political violence on greenfield FDI is heterogeneous across types of violence, 
sectors and firms, falsifying the claim that all FDI flows are negatively affected by 
political violence. These findings demonstrate that the sensitivity of investment by MNEs 
to political conflict is reduced by (1) the extent to which conflict is localized, (2) whether 
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there are constraints on location choice due to requirements on inputs, (3) the size of 
economic rents and (4) the extent to which the firm is sufficiently internationalized to 
diversify the risk posed by conflict. On the other hand, the spread of violence, its 
continuity and its impact positively affect the sensitivity of investment to political 
violence. Only investment by relatively non-diversified MNEs in the non-resource sector is 
affected by nationwide armed conflict. Other types of political violence (e.g. localized 
armed conflict, terrorism, political terror) do not affect greenfield FDI flows.  
Chapter 4 looks at the effect of armed conflict on MNEs’ location choice strategies, 
shedding light on how armed conflict moderates the effect of home-host ties on location 
choice strategies. Whereas the ways in which international wars can disrupt international 
(business) relationships are relatively well understood, this paper demonstrates how 
internal conflict – currently the dominant form of armed conflict– affects these 
relationships. The focus is on historical ties, specifically ties resulting from colonial 
history. I find that similar to international conflict, internal wars can disturb existing 
relationships between the MNEs’ home and host country. However, smaller conflicts have 
no effect on the relevance of these ties for FDI. These results do not support the idea that 
connected firms can benefit more from the confusion caused by political conflict. In 
contrast, they seem to have more to lose and accordingly face considerable incentives to 
avoid the outbreak of wars.  
 
5.2 IMPLICATIONS 
5.2.1 Implications for government 
Political conflict has become more prevalent in the last decades and with the consequences 
of global warming becoming more pronounced, the prospects of world peace are only 
declining. Although it might be impossible to prevent these conflicts all together, an 
improved understanding of their causes makes it easier to anticipate them and by 
addressing these causes, some conflicts might be avoided. In terms of the findings of this 
thesis, this implies two things. First, we need to strengthen the efforts to collect data on 
developing countries. This thesis provides evidence that decreases in subjective wellbeing 
can explain non-violent conflicts, although not armed conflict (Chapter 2). Hence, non-
violent political conflict, which is often the predecessor of major instability and armed 
conflict, has systematic causes and might hence be predicted by monitoring data on 
subjective wellbeing together with traditional measures of economic development. Data 
collection efforts should therefore not be limited to objective socioeconomic indicators, 
and special attention should be given to collecting data on subjective wellbeing. By 
combining objective and subjective data, a more complete picture can be drawn of how 
prosperous societies are and how probable political conflict is. The importance of more 
inclusive data collection efforts is exemplified by the Arab Spring, which took economist 
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and policymakers by surprise, whereas those that monitored the downward trend in 
subjective wellbeing could have anticipated the conflict.  
Second, more attention should be given to societies that appear to be suffering in terms of 
subjective wellbeing. Here the case of ‘unhappy development’ merits special attention. 
Countries experiencing ‘unhappy development’ prosper in terms of objective indicators of 
development, but suffer in terms of subjective wellbeing. The Arab Spring was preceded 
by a period of such unhappy development. There is preliminary evidence that the quality 
of institutions and welfare policies influence the extent to which economic growth 
translates to improvements in subjective wellbeing (Burger, Ianchovichina, Arampatzi, 
Devarajan, Veenhoven & Witte, 2017). Hence, policies should not only be evaluated in 
terms of objective economics outcomes, but also in terms of their effect on subjective 
wellbeing. This is not just relevant for democratically elected leaders, who will be 
punished for reductions in subjective wellbeing at the ballot box, but also for malevolent 
autocratic regimes, which face the risk of unhappy citizens ‘taking to the streets’.  
Regarding the consequences of (violent) conflict for FDI inflows, my findings suggest that 
conflict countries are still able to attract FDI. For Sub-Saharan Africa, I find that 13.9% of 
investments are actually attracted to conflict countries (Chapter 4). FDI into the resource 
sector is to a large extent insensitive to political conflict (Chapter 3). This is the result of 
the rents that could be obtained by investment in new resource reserves and the constraints 
on location choice that these firms face. However, when the development of alternative 
sources of energy reduces the constraints on location choice within the resource sector, or 
if the economic rents associated with resource extraction drop, resource MNEs are likely to 
be considerably less willing to invest in countries experiencing political conflict. This 
would make it more difficult for countries afflicted by conflict to attract FDI.  
However, the question remains whether resource-related FDI, which has been related to 
the resource curse, is beneficial for fragile economies in the first place. Although the effect 
of FDI in the resource sector– or any other sector– on prosperity is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, I would recommend that conflict countries focus on attracting MNEs in the 
non-resource sector instead, as resource dependence has been associated with decreased 
prosperity and peace (e.g. Collier, 1998; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hodler, 2006; Poelhekke 
& Van der Ploeg, 2013; Sachs & Warner, 1995). I find evidence that also non-resource 
multinationals which are sufficiently internationally diversified are insensitive to political 
conflict (Chapter 3). Firms active in at least 26 different countries even seem to be 
attracted to conflict countries. Investment promotion agencies could target their efforts to 
non-resource firms that are somewhat internationalized, but not yet to the extent that they 
can completely diversify the risk of conflict. Additional incentives or information could 
convince these firms to invest anyhow. 
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Although non-resource FDI could inject capital in a war-ridden economy and create much 
needed employment opportunities, the question remains whether these foreign investments 
will eventually benefit the citizens of the conflict-afflicted country. Although this question 
is not answered directly in this dissertation, the fact that MNEs invest during a conflict 
rather than just before or after it, could suggest that they benefit from the conflict. This 
might be because other firms are not willing to invest, which reduces competition and 
increases monopoly rents, or because MNEs profit from rebellion more directly. Yet, in 
both cases firms have an incentive to prolong conflict. Even if MNEs invest despite 
conflict, because they, for example, expect to obtain a first-mover advantage when fighting 
stops, it is doubtful whether this will benefit the conflict-afflicted country, as there is 
strong evidence that the effect of FDI on prosperity depends critically on a country’s 
absorptive capacity. Only if financial markets are sufficiently well developed, there is a 
basic level of human capital and the quality of institutions is high, will FDI inflows 
positively affect economic development. During political conflict these aforementioned 
factors tend to be lagging and hence it is unclear whether attracting MNEs to conflict-
afflicted countries enhances prosperity. By sharing data on investment, employment and 
tax collection with researchers, governments can assist research on this topic. Table 5.1 
summarizes the recommendations for government agencies.  
Table 5.1 Implications and recommendations for government agencies.  
Recommendations for government agencies 
Prosperity & political conflict Political conflict & FDI 
- Strengthen the efforts to collect more 
data on objective and perceived 
prosperity. 
- Be aware that although on average 
conflict does not affect oil and gas FDI, 
growth in renewable energy production, 
is likely to increase the sensitivity of oil 
and gas MNEs to conflict. 
- Pay more attention to societies that are 
suffering in terms of subjective 
wellbeing – also when objective 
measures indicate prosperity 
improvements. 
- Provided that conflict countries are 
looking to attract FDI, Investment 
Promotion Agencies (IPAs) could 
target non-resource firms that are 
somewhat internationalized, but not yet 
to the extent that they can completely 
diversify the risk of conflict. 
- Evaluate policies not only in terms of 
objective economics outcomes, but 
also in terms of their effect on 
subjective wellbeing. 
- Share data on investment, employment 
and tax collection with researchers to 
learn how FDI in conflict countries 
enhances prosperity. 
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5.2.1 Managerial implications  
The findings of this thesis provide managers of MNEs with a more nuanced understanding 
of the risks associated with political conflict. We show that the continuity of the risk is an 
important factor influencing MNEs’ entry strategies, so that exceptionally discontinuous 
risks, such as the risk of a terrorist attack, are so unpredictable that they do not affect FDI 
decisions. Yet, MNEs tend to avoid countries that are afflicted by armed conflict, a type of 
political violence that poses a relatively continuous type of risk and can have a large 
negative impact on a firms’ profits. This suggests that political conflict tends to be 
detrimental to MNEs. This is not surprising, because conflicts decrease the profitability of 
subsidiaries due to supply chain disruption and the risk of capital destruction. The average 
MNE thus faces incentives to minimize the probability of conflict. Although MNEs are 
unlikely to have a major influence on the outbreak of conflicts, they can nevertheless 
engage in voluntary actions that might decrease human suffering and could accordingly 
decrease conflict. Examples of such actions are providing adequate schooling and 
supporting small business development through skill trainings and microfinance. They 
could also have a more direct effect on the intensity of conflict by refraining from selling 
to those who facilitate conflict or actively mediating between players (Oetzel & Getz, 
2012).  
Yet, the relationship between political conflict and FDI is heterogeneous. Several factors 
determine the sensitivity of FDI to political conflict, most notably:  
(1) sector characteristics, i.e. are there large economic rents or constraints on location 
choice? 
(2) the MNE’s geographic exposure to violence, i.e. is the conflict nationwide or 
localized? 
(3) the MNE’s ability to diversify risk, i.e. is the firm sufficiently internationalized?  
(4) the existence of home-host ties, i.e. do the home and host country share a historical 
connection? 
As such, our results emphasize that the assumption that political violence necessarily 
depresses earnings and puts off investors is too simplistic. Our finding that political 
conflict positively affects greenfield FDI by the most diversified firms, suggests that entry 
into conflict countries might even increase earnings if MNEs are able to absorb 
discontinuous risk. As such, taking into account sector and firm attributes, MNEs might 
want to consider entry into conflict countries, despite the large level of risk posed, with 
the intention of obtaining a competitive advantage. The key for managers is to recognize 
the risk conflict poses to their operations and understand how this risk can be diversified. 
In this regard, size does matter. Or to quote Africa’s richest man, Aliko Dangote, “if you 
are not a big player, you have no way of survival” (Lacqua, 2017, p. 58).   
The findings in this thesis also imply that wars can reduce the importance of colonial ties 
for current investment decisions. These ties are still conducive to business dealings 
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between a previous colony and colonizer, but wars can reduce the advantage that MNEs 
from previous colonizers have. Wars increase the probability of a regime change which in 
turn erodes ties by causing legitimacy problems, increasing institutional distance and 
reducing the value of relational resources. This creates two separate sets of incentives for 
connected and unconnected MNEs. Connected MNEs are likely to benefit from the 
strengthening of a host government’s state capacity and particularly from an increase in 
military power. A strong state could deter rebellion, whilst also decreasing the probability 
that insurgents win a conflict. MNEs could enhance host countries’ state capacity by 
providing intelligence and financial resources, which can be employed to enhance military 
capacity. In addition, connected MNEs can lobby their home country governments, which 
often remain involved with the politics of their colonies, into providing military support to 
the host country’s government, as to deter insurgents. Examples of military support to 
previous colonies include France’s involvement in the conflict in Mali and the British 
participation in the peace keeping mission in South Sudan.  
 
Table 5.1 Implications for managers of MNEs.  
Implications for managers of MNEs 
- The average MNE thus faces incentives to minimize the probability of conflict and 
could engage in voluntary actions that might decrease human suffering and could 
accordingly decrease conflict. 
- The assumption that political violence necessarily depresses earnings is too simplistic, 
there are profit opportunities in conflict countries.   
- To formulate location choice strategies it is essential to understand the risk conflict 
poses to a firm’s operations and how this risk can be diversified. This depends on 
sector characteristics, the MNE’s geographic exposure to violence, the MNE’s the 
ability to diversify risk, and the existence of the existence of home-host ties. 
- Connected MNEs are likely to benefit from the strengthening of a host government’s 
state capacity and particularly an increase in military power. 
- Unconnected MNEs might benefit from a regime change, which opens up 
opportunities for to create partnerships with the new political leaders. 
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In contrast, unconnected MNEs might in the long run benefit from a regime change, 
because this could reduce the advantage of firms originating from a previous colonizer and 
opens up opportunities for non-connected firms to create partnerships with the new 
political leaders. This is particularly the case when new leaders are actively seeking out 
new alliance partners to distinguish themselves from the previous rulers (Bucheli & Kim, 
2012; Siverson & Starr, 1994). By entering a country that is likely to go through a change 
of regime in the near future and partnering up with the opposition party, MNEs can create 
a considerable political first-mover advantage. Likewise, MNEs that enter an economy 
immediately after a regime change might face a window-of-opportunity for the creation of 
connections to speed up the wheels of commerce. Table 5.2 summarizes the implications 
of this thesis for managers of MNEs.  
 
5.3 LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.3.1 Limitations 
Although this thesis provides several new insights into the causes and consequences of 
political conflict, there are some limitations to bear in mind. Most notable, the findings 
presented in this thesis have been obtained using secondary data sources. Data on political 
conflict, obtained from the CNTS, UCDP/PRIO or ACLED, is gathered using media 
sources and accordingly only conflict events that received attention in the media are 
included in the analyses. This is problematic, because media attention is not random. 
Coverage is probably better for countries where there is freedom of press and where the 
information infrastructure is better developed. Both my findings on the causes and the 
consequences of conflict might be affected by this. Regarding the causes of conflict, a 
decrease in press freedom might simultaneously reduce happiness and decrease the ability 
of the media to cover conflict events. Although we include country fixed effects and 
control for several country characteristics related to press freedom, the estimates of the 
effect of unhappiness on non-violent conflict are most likely lower bounds. Regarding the 
consequences of conflict, countries that enjoy more press freedom, might also be more 
likely to attract FDI and hence it is likely that FDI flows are actually more strongly 
reduced than our results suggest. Despite these biases, media-based measures of political 
conflict are currently the best available measure of political conflict, not in the least 
because managers rely on the same information from media sources to make strategic 
decisions.  
Data on FDI flows is collected in a similar manner to conflict data. Data on greenfield FDI 
flows are collected through Financial Times newswires, internal information sources, other 
media sources, project data acquired from industry organizations and investment agencies 
and data purchased from market research and publication companies. Again it is unlikely 
that the coverage of FDI projects in the media is random. Firms that feel that their 
consumers might punish them for their engagement in conflict-afflicted economies, face 
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incentives to hide these projects from the media. Hence, the negative effect we find of 
armed conflict on FDI, could merely be the result of MNEs putting more effort into hiding 
their projects from the media. However, it is unlikely that this can explain our findings on 
the heterogonous nature of this relationship. At the end of Chapter 3 and 4 I further 
elaborate on how our moderation analyses could be affected by sample selection bias.  
Although I aimed to use state-of-the-art techniques to address endogeneity, I cannot be 
certain that the relationships found are causal. To claim causality, a randomized control 
trial would be preferable. In such an experiment the treatment - in this case a war or a 
negative shock to happiness - should be randomized, and accordingly the difference in the 
outcome variable – i.e. non-violent uprisings or FDI – between the treatment and control 
group could be calculated. There are clearly several ethical and practical reasons why 
running a randomized control trial with wars or negative shocks to happiness is impossible. 
Therefore, I resort to second-best econometric techniques. In Chapter 2 we estimate a two-
stage least-square regression, instrumenting subjective wellbeing with deaths due to 
infectious diseases, to verify whether the relationships can be interpreted as causal effects. 
Yet, it is impossible to know with certainty whether our instrument is valid and hence, we 
cannot rule out that our results are driven by endogeneity. In Chapter 3 and 4 addressing 
endogeneity is even more difficult, because finding an instrument for conflict is extremely 
tricky. In these chapters we focus on the mechanisms through which violence could affect 
FDI and we use these mechanisms to rule out alternative explanations. Here I am also 
more cautious in claiming causality and discuss in length how endogeneity concerns could 
have affected the findings in the discussion section of these chapters.  
5.3.1 Future research suggestions 
In the introduction of this dissertation, I emphasized that the relationship between FDI and 
prosperity has received considerable attention in the past, and is therefore not part of the 
research questions of this dissertation. These relationships are depicted with dashed arrows 
in Figure 5.1. However, the findings presented in this thesis raise several questions about 
the relationship between value creation by MNEs and prosperity. These questions are 
targeted to both economists as management scholars. For economists the main question is: 
‘Whether MNEs can promote prosperity in conflict-afflicted countries?’. This question 
could be illustrated by drawing an additional arrow going from political conflict to the 
arrow from FDI to prosperity in Figure 5.1. To management scholars, my questions can be 
summarized as: ‘how can firms structure their operations in conflict zones?’. Below I 
discuss these research directions in depth.  
Future research: economics 
More research is needed to show whether FDI can benefit conflict and post-conflict 
economies. This is particularly important because, the international community has 
repeatedly sanctioned countries experiencing war, disrupting the activities of MNEs active 
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in these countries and often leading to disinvestments (Bais & Huijser, 2005). In addition, 
lobby groups mistrusting the operations in conflict countries called for consumer boycotts, 
reducing the attractiveness of the countries. However, as long as the effect of FDI on these 
countries is not systematically verified, there is only a weak rational for these boycotts and 
sanctions. If MNEs’ involvement in conflict countries has a beneficial effect on economic 
development and reduces political conflict, the way policymakers and the general public 
regard MNEs active in these countries should be reconsidered. 
Previous studies found that in order for countries to benefit from FDI flows into their 
economy, they need to have an initial stock of ‘absorptive capacity’, i.e. the ability of local 
firms to benefit from the presence of a MNE (e.g. Borensztein et al., 1998; Görg & 
Greenaway, 2004). In the case of conflict countries, this absorptive capacity is most likely 
missing, because financial markets, human capital and institutional quality have 
depreciated as a result of conflict. Accordingly, it could be expected that there is little to 
gain from FDI for a conflict-afflicted economy. However, in most studies on FDI and 
absorptive capacity conflict countries are excluded from the sample due to data 
restrictions. It is reasonable to believe that the effect of FDI on conflict-afflicted 
economies is different from non-conflict countries at a similar level of development, 
because there is room for reconstruction of the country. Manufacturing and service FDI 
might help raise the level of human capital and infrastructure FDI could play an important 
role in the reconstruction of internet connectivity, public transport, ports and roads. This is 
especially valuable if the domestic private sector has diminished due to conflict and hence, 
the risk of crowding out domestic firms is limited. Research on the effect of FDI on (post-) 
conflict economies should take into account the heterogeneity across types of firms, 
characteristics of the host country and types of conflict.  
This thesis cannot distinguish between firms that decide to invest in a country because of 
war and those that invest despite war. Firms that invest because of war face incentives to 
prolong conflict and their FDI might hence not be beneficial to the host country’s 
development, whereas firms that invest despite war might be inclined to take actions to 
restrict fighting. Of course, firms that willingly prolong conflict could be punished by 
courts ex post. However, actions that might prolong conflict are not always observable, 
and courts of fragile economies tend to be relatively weak. Hence, it might be preferably to 
design policies that disincentivize entry by firms that profit from conflict and incentivize 
entry by firms that profit from peace. In order to design such policies, more research on 
how to identify war-profiting and the peace-profiting firms is needed.  
In addition, whereas previous work on the relationship between FDI and prosperity has 
extensively analyzed objective indicators of prosperity, the effect of FDI on perceived 
prosperity is largely unknown (Figure 5.1, arrow from FDI to prosperity). This is 
surprising, because the perceptions of citizens rather than the objective conditions 
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influence their actions, including domestic investment decisions, political actions and their 
willingness to engage in conflict. The assumption that if FDI increases objective 
prosperity, it will automatically increase subjective wellbeing, is too simplistic. The 
current anti-globalization sentiments are indicative of this. While the objective benefits of 
globalization were taken for granted, many citizens nevertheless felt aggrieved which 
might have contributed to the Brexit vote and Trump’s election. Hence, we need an 
improved understanding of how FDI affects perceived prosperity and how the institutional 
and cultural context and the type of FDI moderate this relationship.  
Similar to the relationship between objective wellbeing and FDI, the relationship between 
FDI and subjective wellbeing could also go the other way (see bottom arrows, Figure 5.1). 
MNEs might want to consider the level of subjective wellbeing when taking investment 
decisions, as subjective data captures country characteristics that remain under the radar 
using objective data. A happy workforce tends to be more productive (Oswald, Proto & 
Sgroi, 2015) and expatriates might be more willing to live in countries where perceived 
quality of life is relatively high (Schotter & Beamish, 2013). Future research could shed 
light on whether subjective data can explain variation in location choice decisions above 
what is captured by the traditional objective indicators. Similar to studies on the effect of 
economic growth on FDI, such studies have to be innovative in terms of identification 
strategies (e.g. instrument variable analyses and natural experiments) to limit reversed 
causality concerns, whilst also clarifying the mechanisms through which the effect of 
subjective wellbeing on FDI operates.  
Future research: International Business 
Whereas this dissertation focusses on entry decisions into conflict countries, future 
research in the field of IB could focus on the strategies of firms that own a subsidiary in a 
conflict zone. What strategic decision could firms would limit MNEs’ exposure to (armed) 
conflict? How can firms design their operations to improve resilience to conflict? How can 
firms limit consumer boycotts in response to engagement in conflict zones? What is the 
role of tax havens in keeping investments in conflict countries secret? When is it wise to 
abandon a subsidiary when a conflict occurs? And if an MNE decides to exit a conflict 
zone, how could the subsidiary be best dismantled to avoid rebels taking advantage of the 
abandoned firm? These are all examples of possible future research questions. Because 
many of these topics are sensitive, innovative research methods are needed to answer these 
questions. Case studies, possibly combined with a quantitative analysis, and experimental 
research are valuable methodologies in this context, because they can shed light on 
mechanisms and address endogeneity.  
Future research could also focus on how MNEs in fragile economies can support the 
prevention of political conflict. Although MNEs might have limited direct influence on the 
onset of war, they could reduce the extent of human suffering, which could in turn reduce 
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the probability of political conflict. MNEs could work together with local authorities and 
NGOs to limit human suffering. When such activities are chosen wisely, they can 
simultaneously benefit the firm and reduce human suffering – a concept known as 
Creating-Shared Value (Kramer & Porter, 2011). For example, Mars created a program in 
Kenya in which the company provided their deliverers with discounted microfinancing so 
that they could buy a bike. This reduced uncertainties in the Mars supply chain, while also 
improving the earnings of these deliverers. This exemplifies how MNEs can reduce human 
suffering, without it negatively affecting their bottom line. Other ways in which MNEs can 
reduce the probability of intensity of conflict include refraining from selling to those that 
facilitate conflict or providing emergency relieve in the region. More research is needed on 
how these types of strategies can be best applied and to what extent they are efficient in 
reducing conflict risk.  
Assuming that the average MNE profits from peace, there is considerable room within IB 
research to study how firms can reduce human suffering as to limit conflict. Accordingly, 
there is considerable overlap with development economics, which also aims to promote 
human prosperity. In addressing research questions related to how MNEs could promote 
prosperity, interdisciplinary research is invaluable. Whilst economists are knowledgeable 
on how development programs can be best designed, management scholars know how to 
maximize benefits for the firm. Also in terms of methodology, spillover effects between 
the two fields are realizable, especially because experimental research is very appropriate 
for these types of research questions. In the next section, I outline some of the 
opportunities and challenges for partnerships between economics and management.  
5.4 EPILOGUE 
Although this dissertation enhances theory on country risk in several ways, its main goal 
has not been to develop theory, but to improve our understanding of a phenomenon. This 
in stark contrast with the current approach in management research, where theory-building 
is generally believed to be paramount in order to ensure a valuable contribution to the 
field. The IB field has largely de-emphasized the relevance of phenomenon-based research 
and has instead stressed theory-building as a prerequisite for publishing in top journals, 
although the Journal of World Business forms a noteworthy exception to this (Doh, 2015). 
Accordingly, every article published in the top management journals at least claims to 
make a unique far-reaching theoretical advancement. Watts (2017) describes the 
consequences of such a theory-building approach as follows: ‘theories pile up in an often 
incoherent heap, much like the multitude of rooms and stairwells piling up in Sarah 
Winchester’s house’ (p.2). Because it is difficult – if not impossible – to conclusively test 
these theories in the real world, their popularity is to a large extent depended on other 
reasons than their ability to account of empirical relationships.  
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In economics there is less emphasis on theory-building, not in the least because economists 
tend to prefer the term ‘model’ over ‘theory’. To quote Dani Rodrik (2015, p.113): “The 
term ‘theory’ has a ring of ambition”. He argues that theories are presumed to have 
universal and general validity. Even though the toolbox of an economists holds several so-
called theories (e.g. game theory, real options theory, growth theory), in reality they are all 
models which might hold in one setting, but not in another. Models differ from theories, 
because they provide at best partial explanations of causal mechanism and interactions. 
Similar to the role of theories in management research, the importance of models is well 
recognized in economics: “[Models] make economics a science – not a science like 
quantum physics or molecular biology, but a science nonetheless” (Rodrik, 2015, p. 5). 
These models tend to be merely used to clarify hypotheses and explicate assumptions and 
are seen as tools, not end goals per se. Economics journals also acknowledge the relevance 
of papers whose main goal is not the advancement of theory per se, but merely finding 
facts. For example, development economists are nowadays specialized in running small-
scale field experiments to solve an issue on the ground, whether it is to reduce birth rates, 
boosting school participation or increasing savings rates (Ashraf, Field & Lee, 2014; 
Dupas & Robinson, 2013; Miguel & Kremer, 2004).  
Recently there have been attempts to remind (management) scholars that theories are not 
ends in themselves (e.g. Doh, 2015; Hambrick, 2007). Their main aim is to help us make 
sense of the world around us by increasing our understanding of phenomena. Theories or 
models help us organize our thoughts, think of mechanisms and make predictions 
(Hambrick, 2007). As such, theory-building research is strongly related to phenomenon-
based studies. Phenomenon–based research aims to outline and contextualize phenomena, 
whereas theory-building research focusses explicitly on how and why phenomena occur 
(Doh, 2015; Gioia & Pitre, 1990). This means that actually in both types of research 
phenomena are central.  
Watts (2017) promotes the idea of solution-oriented research by putting more emphasis on 
finding answers to practical questions that are salient within the business community or 
civil society. In contrast to theory-building or phenomenon-based research, which both 
focus on phenomena, solution-oriented science is motivated by a question or a problem. 
Examples would be ‘How can we prepare for national disasters?’ or ‘How can I deal with 
corruption when entering a new market?’ Of course, many studies already address 
questions that are directly relevant for managers or society. Nevertheless, there are many 
societal challenges which require scholarly attention and scholars are facing ever 
increasingly pressured by those outside academy too not only publish but too also have a 
relevant and impactful research agenda. Buckley, Doh and Benischke (2017) call for more 
research on so-called ‘grand challenges’, critical global problems that can capture the 
public’s imagination. Examples of these challenges are poverty, global warming, 
infectious diseases and of course violent conflict. When working on these challenges, the 
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development of theoretical approaches will remain extremely important, just not merely 
for the sake of the theory. Paradoxically, the excessive emphasis on theory-building in 
management research might have had the unintended effect of preventing the development 
of theory on new phenomena and challenges (Hambrick, 2007). In addition, a solution-
oriented approach can enhance (social) scientists’ legitimacy by increasing visibility and 
usefulness to outsiders. Hopefully this reduces the skepticism against scientists that seems 
to be growing within society (Gawande, 2016). 
Grand challenges do not adhere to disciplinary boundaries. This is exemplified the topic of 
this dissertation; political conflict is a topic of study in almost all social sciences, most 
notably economics and business. Hence, to generate a more comprehensive understanding 
of these grand challenges, an interdisciplinary approach is essential. Although the 
importance of interdisciplinary research in general - and for solution-oriented research in 
particular - has been widely recognized (Buckley et al., 2017; Cheng, Henisz, Roth & 
Swaminathan, 2009; Dunning, 1989; Watts, 2017), truly interdisciplinary work is rare. In 
order for a study to qualify as interdisciplinary, the approaches from two different 
disciplines need to be integrated. Introducing an existing framework into in a new 
discipline does not make a paper interdisciplinary – neither would it contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon. To achieve interdisciplinarity there are 
two options. A scholar might know the language of both disciplines and be well informed 
of the developments in both fields, making it possible to integrate state-of the-art concepts 
from these fields. In the introduction of this dissertation I explained that being an expert in 
more than one field is strenuous and the academic incentive system is not designed to 
make the efforts worthwhile. The other option is to work in a team with researchers from 
different disciplines. However, to communicate effectively these teams will still require 
scholars who speak the language of at least two disciplines, although in this case they do 
not have to be experts in more than one field. In my future career I aspire to become such a 
bridge-builder and facilitate truly interdisciplinary, solution-oriented research on ‘grand 
challenges’.  
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Summary 
This dissertation evaluates the causes of political conflict and its consequences for foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The studies that are part of this thesis aim to better understand the 
relationships between political conflict, foreign investment and, ultimately, human 
prosperity. The aforementioned concepts are interdisciplinary in nature and the different 
chapters included in this thesis reflect this. By combining conceptual frameworks and 
methodologies from economics and business research, they shed light on the increasing 
levels of political conflict and the reaction of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to this 
development. The papers in this dissertation are inspired by the movement within business 
research to address ‘Grand Challenges’, critical global problems that can capture the 
public’s imagination. This reflected not only in the interdisciplinary approach, but also in 
the phenomena-driven perspective (Buckley, Doh & Benischke, 2017). 
In Chapter 2 the causes of political conflict are examined. Here the focus lies on civil 
resistance, the non-violent counterpart of armed conflict. I estimate regression models 
(OLS, GMM & 2SLS) on a database combining data on non-violent uprisings and 
subjective wellbeing, covering 118 countries over the period 2007 to 2014. The findings 
demonstrate that a decrease in subjective wellbeing (i.e. happiness) can motivate citizens 
to participate in acts of civil resistance. This effect of overall wellbeing on non-violent 
uprisings is to a large extent the result of changes to satisfaction with living standards and 
the perceived capability to have a purposeful and meaningful life. Hence, in contrast to 
previous literature, I find that there are systematic causes of non-violent uprisings, 
although these causes might be difficult to capture using traditional socioeconomic 
indicators. There is however no evidence for a direct relationship between unhappiness and 
armed conflict.  
In Chapter 3 and 4 I analyze the consequences of political conflict for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). In these chapters the focus is on armed conflict. In Chapter 3 I compare 
the effect of armed conflict to other types of political violence, i.e. terrorism, 
assassinations and political terror, and estimate a dynamic fixed effects model for a panel 
of 90 developing countries. The findings demonstrate that only armed political conflict 
deters FDI, whereas other types of political violence do not affect MNEs’ investment 
decisions. I also find that the sensitivity of investment by MNEs to political conflict is 
reduced by (1) the extent to which conflict is localized, (2) whether there are constraints on 
location choice due to requirements on inputs, (3) the size of economic rents and (4) the 
extent to which the firm is sufficiently internationalized to diversify the risk posed by 
conflict. Ultimately, only investment by relatively non-diversified MNEs in the non-
resource sector is affected by nationwide armed conflict. This falsifies the claim that all 
FDI flows are negatively affected by political violence. 
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Chapter 4 looks at the effect of armed conflict on MNEs’ location choice strategies, 
shedding light on how armed conflict moderates the effect of home-host ties on location 
choice strategies. Whereas the ways in which international wars can disrupt international 
(business) relationships are relatively well understood, little is known about how internal 
conflict – currently the dominant form of armed conflict– affects these relationships. This 
paper analyzes how armed conflict and political instability moderates the effect of 
historical ties, specifically ties resulting from colonial history, on FDI. I find that similar to 
international conflict, internal wars can disturb existing relationships between the MNEs’ 
home and host country and accordingly moderate the effect of ties on FDI. However, 
smaller conflicts have no effect on the relevance of ties for location choice decisions. 
These results do not support the idea that connected firms can benefit more from the 
confusion caused by political conflict. In contrast, they seem to have more to lose than 
those without historical ties to the host country and accordingly face incentives to avoid 
the outbreak of wars.  
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de oorzaken van politieke conflicten wereldwijd en de 
consequenties van deze conflicten voor buitenlandse directe investeringen, ook wel bekend 
als FDI. De studies die deel uitmaken van dit proefschrift hebben tot doel de relaties tussen 
politieke conflict, investeringen en menselijke welvaart beter te begrijpen. Deze drie 
begrippen zijn interdisciplinair van aard en de verschillende hoofdstukken in dit 
proefschrift reflecteren dit. Door conceptuele kaders en methodologieën uit de economie 
en bedrijfskunde te combineren, belicht en verklaart dit onderzoek de toenemende mate 
van politiek conflict en de reactie van multinationale bedrijven hierop. Het onderzoek in 
dit proefschrift is geïnspireerd op de beweging binnen bedrijfskunde om 'Grand 
Challenges’, grootse kritieke problemen die tot de verbeelding van het publiek spreken, 
aan te pakken. Dit is niet alleen weerspiegeld in de interdisciplinaire aanpak in dit 
proefschrift, maar ook in het fenomeen-gedreven perspectief (Buckley, Doh & Benischke, 
2017). 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de oorzaken van politieke conflict onderzocht. Hier ligt de nadruk 
op burgerlijk verzet, de geweldloze tegenhanger van gewapend conflict. Ik schat mijn 
regressiemodellen (OLS, 2SLS en GMM) op een database die gegevens over burgerlijk 
verzet combineert met indicatoren van subjectief welzijn in 118 landen in de periode 2007 
tot 2014. Uit de bevindingen blijkt dat een afname in subjectief welzijn (oftewel geluk) 
burgers kan motiveren om deel te nemen aan burgerlijke verzet. Het effect van een 
vermindering van geluk op burgerlijk verzet is grotendeels het gevolg van veranderingen 
in tevredenheid met de levensstandaard en de waargenomen mogelijkheden om een 
doelbewust en zinvol leven te leiden. In tegenstelling tot eerdere literatuur, vind ik dus 
bewijs dat er systematische oorzaken zijn van burgerlijk verzet, hoewel deze oorzaken 
moeilijk gedetecteerd kunnen worden aan de hand van traditionele sociaaleconomische 
indicatoren. Er is echter geen bewijs voor een directe relatie tussen ongeluk en gewapend 
conflict. 
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 analyseer ik de gevolgen van politiek conflict voor FDI. In deze 
hoofdstukken ligt de nadruk op gewapend conflict. In hoofdstuk 3 vergelijk ik het effect 
van gewapend conflict met dat van andere vormen van politiek geweld, d.w.z. terrorisme, 
politieke moorden en politieke terreur en schat een dynamisch model voor een panel van 
90 ontwikkelingslanden. Hieruit blijkt dat alleen gewapende conflicten investeringen 
afschrikken. Andere vormen van politiek geweld (bijvoorbe 
eld gelokaliseerd conflict, terrorisme en politieke terreur) hebben geen invloed op FDI-
stromen. Daarnaast blijkt dat de gevoeligheid van multinationale bedrijven voor politieke 
conflict beperkt wordt door: (1) de mate waarin conflicten gelokaliseerd zijn, (2) 
beperkingen aan locatiekeuzebeslissingen door vereisten aan grondstoffen, (3) de omvang 
 154 
 
van de surpluswinst, en (4) de mate waarin de onderneming voldoende 
geïnternationaliseerd is om conflictrisico’s te diversifiëren. Uiteindelijk worden alleen 
investeringen door relatief minder geïnternationaliseerde multinationals die actief zijn in 
de maak- en service-industrie negatief beïnvloed door (landelijk) gewapend conflict. Dit 
falsificeert de bewering dat alle FDI afneemt in tijden van politiek geweld. 
Hoofdstuk 4 kijkt naar het effect van gewapend conflict op de locatiekeuzestrategieën van 
multinationals, waarbij wordt aangetoond hoe conflict het effect van verbanden tussen het 
huis- en gastland op locatie-keuzestrategieën modereert. Terwijl bekend is hoe 
internationale oorlogen de commerciële relaties tussen landen kunnen verstoren, kijkt dit 
papier naar het effect van binnenlandse conflicten - momenteel de dominante vorm van 
gewapend conflict – op deze relaties. De focus ligt op historische verbanden, in het 
bijzonder, banden die voortvloeien uit de koloniale geschiedenis. De bevindingen laten 
zien dat, vergelijkbaar met internationaal conflict, binnenlandse oorlogen de bestaande 
relaties tussen het thuis- en gastland van de MNE verstoren, opdat ze het effect van 
verbanden op FDI modereren. Kleinere conflicten hebben echter geen invloed op de 
relevantie van deze banden voor FDI. Deze resultaten tonen aan dat het niet klopt dat 
bedrijven uit landen met banden met het gastland meer kunnen profiteren van de 
verwarring veroorzaakt door politieke conflicten. Ze lijken daarentegen meer te verliezen 
te hebben dan multinationals zonder historische banden met het gastland en daardoor 
redenen te hebben om binnenlandse conflicten en regimeveranderingen te voorkomen.  
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